Majority rule in the absence of a majority by Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Majority rule in the absence of a
majority
Klaus Nehring and Marcus Pivato
University of California, Davis, Trent University
2. May 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46721/
MPRA Paper No. 46721, posted 4. May 2013 17:44 UTC
Majority rule in the absence of a majority∗
Klaus Nehring† and Marcus Pivato‡
May 2, 2013
Abstract
What is the meaning of “majoritarianism” as a principle of democratic group
decision-making in a judgement aggregation problem, when the propositionwise ma-
jority view is logically inconsistent? We argue that the majoritarian ideal is best
embodied by the principle of supermajority efficiency (SME). SME reflects the idea
that smaller supermajorities must yield to larger supermajorities. We show that in a
well-demarcated class of judgement spaces, the SME outcome is generically unique.
But in most spaces, it is not unique; we must make trade-offs between the different
supermajorities. We axiomatically characterize the class of additive majority rules,
which specify how such trade-offs are made. This requires, in general, a hyperreal-
valued representation.
1 Introduction
In social choice with two social alternatives, Majority Rule needs no explanation: Majority
rule obtains if the group chooses what the greater number of its members would choose;
axiomatically, it has been characterized in this setting in a classical theorem by May (1952).
With more than two social alternatives, the very meaning of “Majority Rule” is no
longer obvious; to begin with, “the majority” may no longer exist. There is a very straight-
forward, if unsatisfactory, way to extend majority rule, plurality rule, according to which
the group chooses what would be chosen by the plurality, that is: the largest number of
its members. This has the virtue of simplicity, but the vice of oversimplification, as both
practice and theory attest.
To make progress, we need to formulate more sharply the problem that “majoritari-
anism” is meant to answer. We take this to be a kind of group decision which might be
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and Welfare (Moscow), the 2011 Workshop on New Developments in Judgment Aggregation and Voting
(Freudenstadt), the University of Montreal (2011) and the Paris School of Economics (2012). We are
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called a democratic disagreement problem. Such a problem is characterized by five back-
ground assumptions: self-governance, pluralism, decision by procedure, political equality,
and democratic agnosticism. The first three assumptions define a “disagreement problem”
in general, while the last two spell out its distinctly democratic character. Self-governance
means that the group’s decision is to be taken on the basis of the views of the members of
the group themselves, rather than, for example, some “benevolent dictator” or “philoso-
pher king”. Pluralism means there is disagreement among the members on the group
decision and its basis. This disagreement has not been resolved at the time of decision.
It may well be deep-seated and not resolveable by further deliberation among the group;
deliberation has effectively ended. Decision by procedure means that, consistent with the
principle of self-governance and the fact of pluralism, the disagreement cannot be resolved
by trying to determine “who is right”. Instead, the disagreement among the group needs
to be resolved by some aggregation rule or decision procedure. Political equality means
that all members of the group are equal qua members; the aggregation rule must therefore
equally rely on the views of all members. The last assumption is democratic agnosticism.
As political equality is based on equal membership, not on equal wisdom, epistemic com-
petence, or preference intensity, the aggregation rule should rely as little as possible on the
judgemental performance of any particular group member. This consideration provides a
motivation for a distinctly “majoritarian” character of the aggregation rule. Indeed, ma-
joritarian aggregation rules reflect “democratic agnosticism” in a clear-cut manner at least
in those simple cases in which a unified majority exists, namely by simply discounting all
minority opinions completely.
We do not undertake to defend majoritarianism here, based on these or any other
principles. Our task is squarely analytic: to define and articulate what majoritarianism
can mean, on a sufficiently broad and relevant conception of it, within the overall framework
of social choice theory. If this analytic work is done successfully, it should help prepare the
ground for substantive normative discussion. The five background assumptions provide
a common denominator with important strands in contemporary political theory; see for
example Waldron (1999) or Christiano (2006).
As a bridge towards the formal definitions and analysis, we shall adopt the following
informal definition. Its first part is intended to capture self-governance under pluralism,
the second the distinct majoritarian character.
A group acts under majority rule if its choice accords with (one of) the
majority views of its members on the matters at issue. A majority view is one
that is most representative of the distribution of members’ views among feasible
views.
First, by making majoritarianism a matter of determining an appropriate majority view,
this informal definition places the problem squarely within the emerging field of judgement
aggregation theory. Majority Rule is viewed as a “solution criterion” to judgement aggre-
gation problems viewed as disagreement problems; in other words, it is viewed as describing
a class of methods to “best” resolve the disagreement among group members.1
1The word “solution criterion” is meant to be analogous to solution criteria for cooperative bargaining,
for example.
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In line with the general approach of judgement aggregation theory, we shall adopt a
very broad, abstract perspective of what a “view” may be: essentially, any set of binary
(yes-no) judgements on an interrelated set of propositions or “issues” . Formally, if K is a
(finite) set of issues, then a view is an element of some feasible set of views X ⊆ {±1}K.
We will also refer to the set X as a judgement space.2
A classical example is that of ordinal preference aggregation; it will play a leading role
in this paper as well. Here, a view —for the group and for each member —is given by a
(linear) ranking on a set of alternatives. The different issues are given by the comparisons
between different pairs of alternatives. The interpretation is that the members of the group
disagree in their assessment of which alternatives are better or worse for the group as a
whole.
Another example, which originated in the law-and-economics literature (Kornhauser
and Sager, 1986) is the set of factual or normative assessments by a multi-member court
that serve as “reasons” for its decision (“conclusion”); this example has been one of the
stimulants behind the recent growth of judgement aggregation literature (List and Pettit,
2002). In many cases, the views can be seen as beliefs. Conceptually, these beliefs can be
quantitative (as in the aggregation of probabilities), not just qualitative.3
The conception of Majority Rule as “disagreement solution” differs sharply from the
more usual appeal to majoritarian considerations in the more commonly studied problem
of welfare aggregation, including the Arrowian problem of how to derive an ordinal social
welfare function from individual ordinal preference (betterness) rankings. It is important to
keep this distinction in mind here, since majoritarianism appears to be a lot more plausible
in the context of resolving disagreement than in the context of welfare aggregation.4
The second important part of the informal definition is to identify the majority view
with the “most representative” view: the view that, on the whole, “best represents” or
“is best aligned with” the distribution of members’ individual views. More specifically,
the overall alignment of a feasible group view with the distribution of individual views
is measured by the alignment of each proposition that makes up the group view with the
distribution of individual views on that proposition. The latter, in turn, is measured simply
by how many members of the group affirm this proposition, its numerical support. This
focus on the numerical support of alternative views has a natural democratic rationale in
terms of giving an equal voice to each member on each proposition. In view of this feature,
Majority Rule can arguably claim a priveleged status as a democratic disagreement solution
—“democratic” referring to the last two of our background assumptions, political equality
and democratic agnosticism. At the same time, we do not claim that majority rule is a
2Each issue k ∈ K can be identified with a proposition that is to be affirmed or negated; in a more
syntactic vein, if p is a proposition, then the ordered pair (p,¬p) is the issue “whether or not p”.
3Technically, probability aggregation leads beyond the scope of this paper since it requires the aggrega-
tion of judgements on an infinite number of issues. the present paper contains, however, a model which can
also be interpreted as a model of discretized probability aggregation, and which has particularly attractive
properties from a majoritarian perspective.
4Formally, the Arrowian preference aggregation framework admits both the “welfarist” and the group
choice/disagreement interpretation. Arrow’s 1951 classic, Social Choice and Individual Welfare, appeals
to both themes. Unfortunately, as indeed already indicated by the title, the two themes are not always
clearly kept apart there, nor in a lot of the follow-up literature.
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priveleged method for resolving disagreement of views in general. For example, much of
the literature on probabilistic opinion pooling tries to determine the epistemically best
view derivable from a given profile of views of “experts”; such methods can be viewed as
aiming for maximization of epistemic rather than numerical support.
The numerical support for a single proposition measures alignment with that proposi-
tion in an ordinal manner. The overall alignment of a view is thus simply measured by
adding up the numerical support for each proposition constituting that view, after trans-
formation by a common gain function φ. This idea yields the class of “additive majority
rules”. The main result of this paper, Theorem 4.2, characterizes additive majority rules
in terms of two axioms, Supermajority Efficiency and Decomposition. While Decomposi-
tion is applicable to disagreement solutions quite broadly, Supermajory Efficiency serves
as the hallmark of properly majoritarian disagreement resolution, and we now turn to the
motivation of this central analytical concept of the paper.
A first step towards making formally precise our informal “representativeness” concep-
tion of Majority Rule has been taken in Nehring et al. (2011). It is based on a minimalist
criterion of greater representativeness, according to which a view x is more representative
of the distribution of individual views than some other view y if x agrees with the majority
on each issue on which y does, and also on some issue on which y does not. The maximal
elements with respect to this partial ordering are called Condorcet admissible.
To illustrate how Condorcet admissibility reflects democratic agnosticism, consider a
situation of preference aggregation in which everyone agrees on the ranking of all but one
alternative a. Then it is easily checked that there is a unique Condorcet admissible ranking
(up to ties), which ranks a at the median ranking (relative to the other alternatives). This
is clearly robust against changes of individual views. By contrast, the Borda rule, to take
a paradigmatic non-majoritarian preference aggregation rule, ranks a roughly at the mean
ranking relative to the others. This is clearly very sensitive to changes in individual views,
and may thus be questioned from the point of view of democratic agnosticism as putting
too much store into every individual view.
A problem with Condorcet admissibility is its indecisiveness. Ignoring potential ties,
Condorcet admissibility yields a unique maximal element if and only if the majority judge-
ment on each issue forms itself a feasible view. Consider, for example, the problem of
preference aggregation on three alternatives {a, b, c}, with 40% of the members holding
the ranking abc (a first, b second, and c third), 35% the ranking bca, and 25% the ranking
cab. Then a majority ranks a above b, b above c, and c above a. But the combination of
these three opinions does not form of well-defined ranking itself, hence it does not amount
to a feasible view of the group. By consequence, the Condorcet admissible views are those
that agree with the majority on exactly two out of three propositions; these are the three
rankings abc, bca, and cba.
But this conclusion is more indecisive than necessary. While each of the three Con-
dorcet admissible rankings departs from the majority position on one issue, the ranking abc
departs from the majority on the issue of comparing a and c, overruling a supermajority of
60%; by contrast, the ranking bac overrules a supermajority of 65% (on the comparison of
a versus b), while the ranking cba overrules an even higher supermajority of 75% (on the
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comparison of a versus b). Thus, it stands to reason that there is a unique “most repre-
sentative” ranking, namely the one overruling the smallest majority, which is the ranking
abc.
This advance does not come entirely for free, as it rests on the assumption that all issues
are treated on par; if, somehow, there was an overriding interest in comparing a and c, it
might be questionable to identify the majority view with a ranking which takes a minority
position on exactly that issue. But, in many situations, it is natural and well-justified to
treat all issues on par; for such situations, generalizing the above example, we propose the
criterion of supermajority efficiency as refinement of Condorcet admissibility.
The general idea behind supermajority efficiency is that smaller supermajorities must
yield to larger supermajorities. Yet, in contrast to the above example, in general judgement
aggregation problems, it may no longer be enough to compare one supermajority won to
one supermajority lost. Instead, the entire vectors of supermajorities won or lost need to
be compared to arrive at an appropriate partial ordering of “supermajority dominance”;
the comparison is analogous to a comparison of risky prospects in terms of first-order
stochastic dominance. A view is supermajority efficient (SME) if it is not supermajority
dominated by any other view.
We shall address two main questions in the following. One: when does SME single
out a determinate (i.e. essentially unique) solution? Two: how can a selection among
supermajority efficient views be made otherwise?
To address question one, we ask: which judgement spaces guarantee determinacy of
the SME solution for all profiles? The answer is given by a pair of results. The first of
these provides a general combinatorial characterization (Theorem 6.3); it is amplified by a
companion result which renders this characterization geometrically transparent and easily
checkable under a regularity constraint (Theorem 6.4). We illustrate these results by both
positive and negative examples. Among the positive examples are discrete budget spaces,
which can model, for example, the allocation of public goods or (discretized) probability
judgments.
However, in many judgement spaces of interest (such as for example the space of linear
rankings over four or more alternatives), SME fails to guarantee a determinate solution.
Nonetheless, we show that even then there is a “sizeable” set of profiles that are SME
determinate, while indeterminate under the weaker criterion of Condorcet admissibility.
The indeterminacy of SME in many spaces results from the fact that SME exploits
only ordinal comparisons of supermajority margins. Thus, in general, it may be necessary
to make cardinal tradeoffs among supermajority margins of different sizes. The main
result of this paper, Theorem 4.2, thus characterizes the systematic ways of making such
cardinal trade-offs by means of a representation theorem. It relies on just one axiom besides
supermajority efficiency, an axiom called “Decomposition”.5
The axiom of “Decomposition” requires that if a judgement space can be decomposed
into logically unrelated subsets of issues, the group view on the entire space is derived from
the group views on each of the subsets considered in isolation. The Decomposition axiom
5Theorem 4.2 is based on a more restricted and more elementary version, Theorems 4.1, that is of
independent interest.
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appears compelling from a majoritarian perspective, but does not rely on this perspective
and should be applicable to disagreement solutions quite broadly.
Theorem 4.2 delivers a characterization of the class of “additive majority rules”. Each
of these is described by a “gain-function” φ, which measures how much the numerical
support (i.e. net supermajority margin) for any proposition of a view contributes to its
overall alignment with the profile of member views. An additive majority rule Fφ maximizes
the overall alignment among feasible views, computing the overall alignment of a view as
the simple sum of alignments (“gains”) of all the propositions making up that view.
A privileged place among additive majority rules is occupied by the case in which
gains are simply equal to numerical support; in that case, the associated additive majority
rule is called the median rule, and it simply maximizes the total vote count of a view
over all issues. In the context of preference aggregation, the median rule is also known
as the Kemeny rule (1959), and has been axiomatized by Young and Levenglick (1978).
The median rule has been studied quite extensively for other special classes of judgement
spaces as well (Barthe´le´my and Monjardet, 1981, 1988; Barthe´le´my, 1989; Barthe´le´my and
Janowitz, 1991). We provide a general characterization in the companion paper (Nehring
and Pivato, 2012b).
In the context of preference aggregation, two other aggregation rules have been pro-
posed in the literature, which themselves are not quite SME themselves but which admit
refinements that are. These are the Slater rule (1961), and the Ranked Pairs rule proposed
by Tideman (1987). These rules and their refinements stand at two extreme ends of the
spectrum of additive majority rules. Overall, the mathematical and conceptual unity of the
majoritarian disagreement solutions identified by our main result stands in stark contrast
to the veritable “zoo” of competing majoritarian (Condorcet-consistent) social choice rules
in the standard voting formulation.6
A technically interesting feature of the analysis is the need to allow gain-functions to
take hyperreal values rather than just real values. For example, to ensure SME, the refine-
ments of the Ranked Pairs and Slater rule both require hyperreal-valued representations.
We hope that our techniques may be useful in other applications to social choice and
decision theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic notation
and terminology. Section 3 formally defines supermajority efficiency, with emphasis on
the additive majority rules. Section 4 gives an axiomatic characterization of these rules.
Section 5 considers what the totality of all additive majority rules tells us about a single
judgement problem. Section 6 concerns judgement spaces which are supermajority deter-
minate, meaning that the criterion of supermajority efficiency alone is fully decisive, and
determines a unique collective view. Appendix A is a formal introduction to hyperreal
numbers. Appendices B-F contain the proofs of all the results in the text.
6See Nehring et al. (2011) for a more thorough comparison between the judgement aggregation and
voting approaches to majoritarianism.
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2 Preliminaries
Let K be a finite set, representing a collection of propositions, each of which can be either
true or false. A view on K is an element x ∈ {±1}K, where xk = 1 if x “asserts” proposition
k, and xk = −1 if x “denies” proposition k. A judgement space is a subset X ⊆ {±1}K;
typically X is the set of views which are “admissible” or “logically consistent” according
to our interpretation of the elements of K.
For example, let K = {p, q, c}, where p and q represent two logically independent
“premises”, and c is a “conclusion” whose truth value is determined by p and q. Then let
X ⊂ {±1}K be the set of logically consistent assignments of truth values. (Thus, if c = (p
and q) then X = {x ∈ {±1}K; xc = min(xp, xq)}.) For another example, let A ∈ N, and
let A := [1 . . . A] represent a set of A social alternatives. Let K := {(a, b) ∈ A2; a < b}.
Then any view x ∈ {±1}K can be interpreted as a complete, antisymmetric binary relation
(i.e. a tournament) ≺ on A, where a ≺ b if and only if either xa,b = 1 or xb,a = −1.
(Recall that exactly one of (a, b) or (b, a) is in K.) Now let X prA ⊂ {±1}K be the set of
views representing transitive tournaments (i.e. strict preference orders) on A; this space
is sometimes called the permutahedron. Other judgement spaces encode social decision
problems such as resource allocation, committee selection, and object classification; some
of these examples appear later in this paper, while others are discussed by Nehring and
Puppe (2007), Nehring et al. (2011), and Nehring and Pivato (2011).
Let X ⊆ {±1}K be a judgement space, and let ∆(X ) be the set of all functions µ :
X−→R+ such that
∑
x∈X µ(x) = 1. An element µ ∈ ∆(X ) is called a profile, and describes
a population of (weighted) voters; for each x ∈ X , the value of µ(x) is the total weight of
the voters who hold the view x. We call the pair (X , µ) a judgement problem.
For example, let N be a finite set of voters, and let ω : N−→R+ be a “weight function”
such that
∑
n∈N ω(n) = W for some W < ∞ (reflecting, e.g. the differing expertise or
priority of different voters). For all n ∈ N , let yn ∈ X describe the opinion of voter n.
The profile µ determined by this data is defined:
µ(x) =
1
W
∑
{ω(n) ; n ∈ N and yn = x}, for all x ∈ X . (1)
Judgement aggregation is the problem of selecting an element of X to represent the “col-
lective view” of the voters described by µ. (For example: judgement aggregation over X prA
is classical Arrovian preference aggregation.) Versions of this problem were studied by
Guilbaud (1952), Wilson (1975), Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986), and Barthe´le´my and
Janowitz (1991). Since the work of List and Pettit (2002), there has been much interest in
this area. List and Puppe (2009) and List and Polak (2010) provide two recent surveys.
Fix a set K and a judgement space X ⊆ {±1}K. An aggregation rule on X is a
multifunction F : ∆(X )⇒ X ; for any µ ∈ ∆(X ), it yields a nonempty (usually singleton)
subset F (µ) ⊆ X , which represents the social consensus given the profile x. Sometimes we
restrict F to a smaller domain. For example, if ω : N−→R+ is a weight function, let ∆ω(X )
be the set of all profiles obtained as in equation (1) for some assignment {yn}n∈N ⊂ X of
opinions to the individual voters. We shall sometimes consider a rule Fω : ∆ω(X )⇒ X .
On the other hand, we sometimes define F over a larger domain. For example, let X
be a collection of judgement spaces (possibly with varying choices of K). Let ∆(X) be the
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set of all ordered pairs (X , µ), where X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆(X ). Now an aggregation rule on X
is a multifunction F : ∆(X)⇒
⋃
X∈XX such that, for each X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆(X ), we have
F (X , µ) ⊆ X . (We may indicate F (X , µ) by “F (µ)” if X is clear from context.)
3 Supermajority efficiency
Treat {±1}K as a subset of the vector space RK. For any profile µ ∈ ∆(X ), we define the
majority vector µ˜ = (µ˜k)k∈K ∈ RK by setting
µ˜k :=
∑
x∈X
µ(x) · xk for all k ∈ K. (2)
Thus, µ˜ ∈ conv(X ) (the convex hull of X in RK). The vector µ˜ records how much “nu-
merical support” there is for each of the propositions in K. For any k ∈ K, we have µ˜k > 0
(resp. < 0) if a majority asserts (resp. denies) proposition k, and µ˜k = 1 (resp. −1) if the
voters unanimously assert (resp. deny) proposition k.
Given a profile µ ∈ ∆ (X ), a view x is at least as widely shared as view y (“x ≥
µ
y” ) if,
on each issue k ∈ K, the judgement xk entailed by the former is at least as widely shared
as the judgement yk entailed by the latter. Formally, x ≥µ y if, for all k ∈ K,
xk µ˜k ≥ yk µ˜k. (3)
The view x is more widely shared than y (“x >
µ
y” ) if the inequality in (3) is strict for
some k ∈ K. Note that (3) is equivalent to requiring that the judgement entailed by x on
some issue k is aligned with the majority judgement on that issue whenever the judgement
entailed by y is: for all k ∈ K, we have
xkµ˜k≥0 if ykµ˜k ≥ 0.
This paraphrase establishes a clear connection to basic intuitions about “majoritarianism”.
A view is a candidate for a best majoritarian disagreement resolution if it is maximal
among the feasible (i.e. logically consistent) views with respect to the partial order >µ;
these will be called the Condorcet admissible views, and their set will be denoted by
Cond (X , µ). Formally,
Cond (X , µ) := {x∈X : y >
µ
x for no y∈X}.
Clearly (ignoring majority ties), the Condorcet admissible view is unique if and only if there
exists a feasible view that agrees with the majority judgement on each issue. Formally, for
any x ∈ {±1}K, we define
M(µ,x) := {k ∈ K ; xk µ˜k ≥ 0}. (4)
This is the set of all propositions where x agrees with the majority view. (Thus, x ≥
µ
y
if and only if M(µ,x) ⊇ M(µ,y).) Let Maj(µ) := {x ∈ {±1}K; M(µ,x) = K}. This
set is always nonempty, and is usually a singleton, unless there is a “perfect tie” on some
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propositions. (If Maj(µ) = {x}, then we will abuse notation by writing “Maj(µ) = x” and
defining Majk(x) := xk for all k ∈ K.)
If Maj(µ) ∩ X 6= ∅, then it is possible to comply with the majority opinion on every
proposition, while still respecting the logical constraints defining X . Unfortunately, as
shown by the “Condorcet paradox” in the context of preference aggregation mentioned in
the introduction, in many judgement spaces, we may have Maj(µ) ∩ X = ∅ for some µ ∈
∆(X ). In this case, the Condorcet admissible view is not unique. Indeed, the Condorcet
set may easily be large; it may even happen that Cond (X , µ) = X in some cases.
But a majoritarian approach to disagreement resolution does not need to stop here,
as it can avail itself of considerations that, while not distinctly majoritarian, are perfectly
sound from a majoritarian perspective. One such consideration – simple but powerful –
derives from the observation that, in many judgement aggregation problems, it makes sense
to treat all issues “on par”, to give them equal weight as parts of the group view that is
to be chosen. This motivates the central idea of this paper: supermajority efficiency. Let
µ ∈ ∆(X ) and let q ∈ [0, 1]. For any x ∈ X , let
γµ,x(q) := #{k ∈ K ; xk µ˜k ≥ q}. (5)
This measures the number of coordinates of x for which the popular support exceeds the
supermajority threshold q. For example, γµ,x(0) is the number of coordinates where x
receives at least a bare majority, γµ,x(0.5) is the number of coordinates where x receives
at least a 75% supermajority, and γµ,x(1) is the number of coordinates where x receives
unanimous support.
For any x,y ∈ X , write “x 
µ
y” (“x weakly supermajority-dominates y” ) if γµ,x(q) ≥
γµ,y(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1]. This relation is transitive and reflexive, but generally not complete.
Write “x ≡
µ
y” (“x is supermajority equivalent to y”) if x 
µ
y and x 
µ
y (equivalently,
γµ,x(q) = γµ,y(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1]). Finally, write “x µ y” (“x supermajority-dominates
y”) if x 
µ
y but x 6≡
µ
y. A view x is supermajority efficient (SME) if it is maximal among
the feasible (i.e. logically consistent) views with respect to the relation 
µ
. The set of
SME views will be denoted by SME (X , µ). Formally,
SME (X , µ) := {x ∈ X ; y 
µ
x for no y ∈ X}.
Supermajority efficiency thus mandates overruling, if necessary, small supermajorities in
favor of an equal or larger number of supermajorities of equal or greater size. Formally, su-
permajority dominance 
µ
goes beyond majority dominance >
µ
, by replacing a coordinate-
wise comparison by a distributional comparison, paralleling the step from ex-post domi-
nance to first-order stochastic dominance in the theory of decision making under risk.
Example 3.1. Let A = {a, b, c}, and let K := { “a  b”, “b  c”, “c  a”}; then
X prA is a subset of {±1}K. If µ ∈ ∆(X prA ) and Maj(µ) 6∈ X prA , then Maj(µ) must be a
Condorcet cycle —say “a  b  c  a”. Thus, we have µ˜ab > 0, µ˜bc > 0, µ˜ca > 0.
To compute SME (X prA , µ), we break the “weakest link(s)” in this cycle. For instance, if
µ˜ca < min{µ˜ab, µ˜bc}, then SME (X prA , µ) = {a  b  c}. On the other hand, if µ˜ca =
µ˜ab < µ˜bc, then SME (X prA , µ) = {a  b  c, b  c  a}. And if µ˜ca = µ˜ab = µ˜bc > 0,
then SME (X prA , µ) = {a  b  c, b  c  a, c  a  b}.
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This illustrates the general pattern. If there is a single “‘weakest link”’ in the Condorcet
cycle, then SME (X prA , µ) is a singleton. This case is generic: it holds for a dense open
subset of profiles in ∆(X prA ). In the exceptional case when there are two (respectively,
three) “weakest links”, the set SME (X prA , µ) contains two (respectively, three) elements.
Finally, if µ˜ca = µ˜ab = µ˜bc = 0, then clearly SME (X prA , µ) = X prA . ♦
As Example 3.1 shows, on some judgement spaces, the supermajority efficient set is
typically a singleton. A judgement space with this property is called supermajority deter-
minate; these spaces are characterized in §6. However, in many judgement spaces X , the
size of the set SME (X , µ) will depend on the profile µ, and may be large. For example,
if |A| ≥ 4, then the analysis in Example 3.1 breaks down, and SME (X prA , µ) is no longer
generically a singleton (see Proposition 6.7(a)). In this case, it is necessary to select from
this set, which means we must make tradeoffs between supermajorities of different sizes.
A systematic way of making such tradeoffs determines an aggregation rule. We will thus
be interested in aggregation rules which satisfy the following axiom:
Axiom 1 (Supermajority efficiency) An aggregation rule F : ∆(X )⇒ X is superma-
jority efficient if F (µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(X ).
For example, the median rule is defined:
Median (X , µ) := argmax
x∈X
(x • µ˜), for all µ ∈ ∆(X ), (6)
where x • µ˜ :=
∑
k∈K
xk µ˜k, for any x ∈ X .
In the setting of Arrovian preference aggregation (i.e. when X is a permutahedron), this
corresponds to the Kemeny (1959) rule.
A (real-valued) gain function is an increasing function φ : [−1, 1]−→R. For any judge-
ment space X ⊆ {±1}K and any gain function φ, we define the additive majority rule
Fφ : ∆(X )⇒ X as follows:
for all µ ∈ ∆(X ), Fφ(µ) := argmax
x∈X
(∑
k∈K
φ(xk µ˜k)
)
. (7)
In the functional form (7), each view x is evaluated according to its “overall alignment”
with the profile µ of individual views, as measured by Φ (x, µ) :=
∑
k∈K φ (xkµ˜k). The
gain function φ translates, for each issue k ∈ K, the numerical support for the judgement
on k entailed by the view x (given by xkµ˜k) into the “gain” φ (xkµ˜k), which measures the
alignment of x with µ on issue k. To determine the overall alignment of x with µ, these
gains are then added up over all issues k ∈ K. Since gain functions are increasing by
definition, it is easily seen that additive majority rules are always SME.
Importantly, as shown below in Proposition 3.2, without loss of generality, it can be
assumed that the gain function φ is odd , i.e. that, for all r ∈ [−1, 1], φ (−r) = −φ (r) , or,
equivalently, φ (r) = sign (r)φ (|r|). Call φ|| : r 7→ φ (|r|) the absolute gain function.7
7While the gain function is most useful and natural mathematically, the absolute gain function is most
useful to discuss specification and shape.
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If gain equals numeric support, i.e. if φ is the identity function or linear, then Fφ is
the median rule (5). While this is a natural baseline case, a non-proportional response of
gains to numeric support makes a lot of intuitive sense.
To better understand alternative shapes of the gain function, assume that φ is odd
and, to simplify, that it is differentiable. Consider the impact on the overall alignment of
view x of a change in the view of one among N voters from view y to view z, when the
distribution of others’ views is ν ∈ ∆ (X ) . This impact is given by Φ (x, 1
N
δz +
N−1
N
ν
) −
Φ
(
x, 1
N
δy +
N−1
N
ν
)
, which is easily seen to be equal to
∑
k:yk 6=zk φ
(
xk
(
1
N
δzk +
N−1
N
ν˜k
)) −
φ
(
xk
(
1
N
δyk +
N−1
N
ν˜k
))
. If φ is differentiable and N is sufficiently large, this in turn is
approximately equal to
1
N
∑
k:yk 6=zk
φ′ (ν˜k)xk (zk − yk) .
Thus, the rule Fφ values the change of support on issue k (namely, xk (zk − yk)) with
weight proportional to φ′ (ν˜k) , which is equal to φ′ (|ν˜k|) by oddness. Thus, at the margin,
the Fφ weighs the “vote” of any member as function of the extent of the agreement on k
among the other member |ν˜k|. Fφ is the median rule if and only if the weighting of the votes
is independent of the other members’ views; call this the agreement-neutral case. If φ′|| is
increasing (in other words, if the absolute gain function φ|| is convex, and the gain function
is “inverse-S-shaped”), then votes matter more on issues on which there already is a lot
of agreement; call such rules the agreement-focused. Agreement focusing seems intuitively
rather attractive, especially at the high end. Consider the extreme case of unanimity
among all the other members. Then a lone dissent, if it materializes, would naturally carry
special weight, since it amounts to a qualitative change from complete agreement to some
disagreement overall. The resulting convexity of the absolute gain function implies that
large supermajorities carry disproportionate weight, and are unlikely to be overruled.
By contrast, if φ′|| is decreasing (that is, if the absolute gain function φ|| is concave and
the gain function φ is “S-shaped”), then votes matter more on issues which are highly con-
tested in that there already is a lot of disagreement; call such rules disagreement-focused.
Disagreement focusing seems somewhat less plausible, but not outlandish, especially near
the low end, when an individual change of opinion on an issue can be pivotal for the major-
ity preference on that issue. The resulting concavity of the absolute gain function implies
that Fφ puts emphasis on the number of issues in which the group judgement agrees with
the majority of members. The more concave φ is, the more easily a large supermajority,
possibly even unanimity, is overruled by a number of smaller supermajorities.
To illustrate with a simple functional form, fix d ∈ (0,∞), and define φd : [−1, 1]−→R
by φd(r) := sign(r) · |r|d for all r ∈ [−1, 1], as shown in Figure 1. The corresponding
additive majority rule Hd := Fφd is called the homogeneous rule of degree d.
If d = 1, then Hd is the median rule. If 1 < d < ∞, then the gain-function φd
is inverse-S-shaped, thus Fφd is agreement-focused. The agreement focus and resulting
privileging of large supermajorities becomes more exacerbated as d increases; in the limit,
that privileging becomes lexical; the limiting Leximax rule can be described as follows. For
any x,y ∈ X , write “x ≈
µ
y” if γµ,x = γµ,y; otherwise write “x µ y” if there exists some
Q ∈ (0, 1] such that γµ,x(q) = γµ,y(q) for all q > Q, while γµ,x(q) > γµ,y(q). Then µ is a
11
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Figure 1: Gain functions for homogeneous rules
complete, transitive ordering of X . We then define
Leximax (X , µ) := max(X , 
µ
). (8)
In other words, Leximax first maximizes the number of coordinates which receive unan-
imous support (if any); then, for every possible supermajoritarian threshold q ∈ (0, 1],
Leximax maximizes the number of coordinates where the support exceeds q, with higher
values of q given lexicographical priority over lower ones.8
On the other hand, if 0 < d < 1, then the gain-function φd is S-shaped, and thus
Fφd is disagreement-focused. The disagreement focus and resulting deprivileging of large
supermajorities becomes more exacerbated as d decreases; in the limit, Fφd becomes a
refinement of the Slater rule.9 Slightly abusing notation, the Slater rule can be defined
as Slater (X , µ) := Fφ(X , µ), where φ (r) := sign(r) for all r ∈ [−1, 1]. Note that φ is
not a proper gain-function, since it is merely non-decreasing, not strictly increasing. As
a consequence, while majority admissible, the Slater rule is not SME. On the other hand,
there are refinements of the Slater rule that are SME, since Slater is always consistent with
SME, in the sense that Slater (X , µ) ∩ SME (X , µ) 6= ∅ for any µ ∈ ∆(X ).
At first sight, the Leximax rule and these SME refinements of the Slater rules appear
to be natural examples of SME rules that are not additive majority rules, indicating a
significant limitation of this family. But this limitation is more apparent than real, since it
can be overcome by allowing gains to be infinite and/or infinitesimally-valued —technically,
by extending the co-domain of the gain function φ.
Perhaps the broadest such extension which makes sense is that to what is called a
linearly ordered abelian group (L,+, >). Here, abelian group means that + is an associative,
commutative, invertible binary operation on L. Meanwhile, linearly ordered means that
> is a linear ordering relation compatible with +, in that r > 0 iff r + s > 0 for all
r, s ∈ L. An L-valued gain function is now any increasing function φ : [−1, 1]−→L. (Note
8The Leximax rule is a refinement of the Ranked Pairs proposed by Tideman (1987) in the setting of
preference aggregation; see also Zavist and Tideman (1989). The Ranked Pairs rule itself is not SME, but
it agrees with the Leximax rule on profiles µ for which µ˜k 6= µ˜` if k 6= `. With a finite number of members,
it can easily be substantially coarser.
9Proof sketch: For any x,y ∈ X , if x ∈ Slater (X , µ) and y 6∈ Slater (X , µ), then ∑k∈K sign(µ˜k xk) >∑
k∈K sign(µ˜k yk), which implies that Φ
d(x, µ) > Φd(y, µ) for all d close enough to 0. Thus, y 6∈ Fφd(µ)
if d is close to 0. Since X is finite, we can repeat this argument for all y 6∈ Slater (X , µ) to conclude that
Fφd(µ) ⊆ Slater (X , µ) for all d close enough to 0.
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that a real-valued gain function is a special case, because R is a linearly ordered abelian
group.) Given any L-valued gain function φ, we can define the additive majority rule Fφ as
in equation (7). Then Fφ is easily seen to be SME.
But this is more general than necessary. Indeed, it turns out that one can always let
the co-domain be a linearly ordered real field L. As a real field, L possesses a well-defined
multiplication operation and contains the real numbers R as a subfield. Linear orderedness
now means that the ordering relation is compatible with addition and multiplication; the
latter requires that ` ·m > m for all `,m ∈ L with ` > 1 and m > 0.
A linearly ordered real field L can be viewed as R augmented by infinite and infinitesimal
numbers. An element ` in L is infinite if |`| > N for all N ∈ N. On the other hand, ` is
infinitesimal if |`| < 1/N for any N ∈ N (or equivalently, if 1/` is infinite). If ` is neither
infinite nor infinitesimal, then it is finite. For any finite ` ∈ L, there exists a unique r ∈ R
and infinitesimal  ∈ L such that ` = r + . We then write st (`) = r; this is called the
standard part of `.
For example, with linearly ordered real fields containing infinitesimals, we can define
refinements of the Slater rule as additive majority rules. Let ψ : [−1, 1]−→R be any strictly
increasing function, let  ∈ L be an infinitesimal, and define φ : [−1, 1]−→L by φ(r) :=
sign(r) +  ψ(r) for all r ∈ [−1, 1]. Then the additive majority rule Fφ is a supermajority
efficient refinement of the Slater rule. That is, Fφ(µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ)∩ Slater (X , µ) for any
µ ∈ ∆(X ).10
For most purposes, this is an adequate level of generality. To achieve full generality,
one may need to ensure that number of infinite and infinitesimal elements is sufficiently
“large”. This is done by assuming L to be an appropriate hyperreal field ∗R. (Formally,
∗R is an ultrapower of R; see Appendix A for details.)
As a bonus, hyperreal fields allow well-defined exponentiation as well. This is useful in
particular to make the range of different infinities arithmetically accessible, as, for example,
in obtaining a representation of the Leximax rule in terms of a hyperreal valued gain
function. In sum: hyperreals are very user-friendly and quite intuitive in describing various
additive majority rules in a unified manner. For clarity, we sum up the above discussion
as follows.
Definition. Let K be a finite set of propositions, and let X ⊆ {±1}K be a judgement
space. An aggregation rule F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X is an additive majority rule if there
exists a linearly ordered abelian group11 L and a strictly increasing gain function
φ : [−1, 1]−→L such that, for all profiles µ ∈ ∆(X ), we have
F (µ) = argmax
x∈X
(∑
k∈K
φ(xk µ˜k)
)
. (9)
10Proof: For any x,y ∈ X , if x ∈ Slater (X , µ) and y 6∈ Slater (X , µ), then ∑k∈K sign(µ˜k)xk >∑
k∈K sign(µ˜k) yk, which implies that φ(µ˜) • x > φ(µ˜) • y. Thus, y 6∈ Fφ(µ). Thus, Fφ(µ) ⊆ Slater (X , µ).
The supermajority efficiency of Fφ follows from Theorem 4.2(a) below.
11This includes the special case when L is the additive structure of a linearly ordered field; in particular,
it includes the case when L is the field of real numbers R or a hyperreal field ∗R.
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More generally, let X be a collection of judgement spaces. An aggregation rule F on
X is an additive majority rule if there exist L and φ as above such that, for all X ∈ X
and all µ ∈ ∆(X ), the outcome F (X , µ) is defined by formula (9).
For the sake of generality, we allow L to have the general structure of linearly ordered
abelian group in this definition. However, Proposition 4.4 (in Section 4) will establish
that, without loss of generality, L can always be assumed to be a hyperreal field. This
representation is appealing because of the similarity between hyperreal arithmetic and
ordinary real-valued arithmetic, which may sit more comfortably with some readers than
an abstract abelian group. Thus, in the remainder of the paper, we will focus on hyperreal-
valued gain functions.
It is a notable feature of the functional form (9) that one can assume without loss of
generality that the gain function φ is odd, i.e. that φ (−r) = −φ(r) for all r ∈ [−1, 1].
Heuristically, this means that φ gives exactly the same weight towards a majority opinion
that some proposition k is true as it does towards an equal-sized majority opinion that k is
false; hence Fφ is not biased towards either truth or falsehood. In terms of the function’s
graph, oddness of φ is equivalent to symmetry of the graph around the point (0, 0), as
illustrated by the homogeneous rules depicted in Figure 1.
Odd functions are completely determined by their behavior on the positive unit interval
[0, 1] (or, symmetrically, the negative unit interval [−1, 0]). For example, an odd φ function
is inverse-S shaped if and only if it is convex on the positive unit interval. In view of the
next result, we will henceforth take gain-functions to be increasing and odd functions from
[−1, 1] to ∗R.
Proposition 3.2 Let φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be any increasing gain function. Define the function
φ̂ by φ̂ (r) := φ (r) − φ (−r) for r ∈ [−1, 1]. Then φ̂ is odd and increasing, and yields the
same aggregation rule, i.e. Fφ̂ = Fφ.
Proposition 3.2 is due to the fact that at a given profile µ, an aggregation rule can only
choose between affirming or overriding the majority of size |µ˜k| on a particular proposition
k. Accordingly, φ̂ (r) describes the gain from affirming rather than overriding a majority
of the same size r on any particular proposition; it follows that the gains associated with
negative majority margins are the mirror images of the gains associated with positive ones.
If ∗r ∈ ∗R and x ∈ {±1}, then x · ∗r is also an element of ∗R. Thus, if ∗r ∈ ∗RK and
x ∈ {±1}K, then we can define x • ∗r := ∑k∈K xk · ∗rk, an element of ∗R. In particular, for
any µ ∈ ∆(X ), we define φ(µ˜) := [φ(µ˜k)]k∈K ∈ ∗RK; then x • φ(µ˜) =
∑
k∈K xk · φ(µ˜k).
Corollary 3.3 Let φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be an odd gain function, and let (X , µ) be a judgement
problem.
(a) Fφ(X , µ) = argmax
x∈X
∑
k∈K
φ [(xk µ˜k)+] = argmax
x∈X
∑
k∈M(x,µ)
φ |µ˜k|.12
(b) Also, Fφ(X , µ) = argmax
x∈X
x • φ(µ˜).
12For any r ∈ R, recall that r+ := min{r, 0}. Meanwhile, M(µ,x) is as defined in equation (4).
14
In view of Corollary 3.3(b), all additive majority rules are alike. This is particular clear in
the real-valued case. In this case, a view is maximal under the rule Fφ at the profile µ iff
it is maximal under the median rule Fmed at a fictitious profile with the vector of majority
margins φ (µ˜).13
Additive majority rules have two other attractive properties: they are monotone and
generically single-valued. For any µ ∈ ∆(X ), let X (µ) := {x ∈ X ; µ(x) > 0}. Let
µ′ ∈ ∆(X ) and let y ∈ X . We say that µ′ is more supportive than µ of y if µ′(y) > µ(y),
while µ′(x) < µ(x) for all x ∈ X (µ) \ {y}, and µ′(x) = µ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X \ X (µ).
(For example: if δy ∈ ∆(X ) is the unanimous profile at y, then for any µ ∈ ∆(X ) and
any r ∈ (0, 1], the convex combination r δy + (1 − r)µ is more supportive than µ of y.)
A judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X is monotone if, for any µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(X ), and
y ∈ F (µ), if µ′ is more supportive than µ of y, then F (µ′) = {y}. In other words: if y
is already one of the winning alternatives, then any increase in the support for y at the
expense of support for other elements of X will make y the unique winning alternative.
The rule F is generically single-valued if there is an open dense subset O ⊂ ∆(X ) such that
|F (µ)| = 1 for all µ ∈ O.
Proposition 3.4 Let ∗R be any hyperreal field, and let φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be any gain func-
tion. Then for any judgement space X , the additive majority rule Fφ is (a) monotone, and
(b) generically single-valued on ∆(X ).
Technically, genericity is defined only for a continuum of individuals. Nevertheless,
if the number of voters is finite but “large”, then Proposition 3.4(b) can be interpreted
heuristically as saying that ties are uncommon. However, if the number of voters is finite
but “small”, then genericity has no bearing.
A judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(X )⇒ X is upper hemicontinuous (uhc) if, for every
µ ∈ ∆(X ), each of the following two equivalent statements is true:
(UHC1) There exists some  > 0 such that, for any  ∈ (0, ) any other ν ∈ ∆(X ), we
have F ( ν + (1− )µ) ⊆ F (µ).
(UHC2) For every sequence {µn}∞n=1 ⊂ ∆(X ), and every x ∈ X , if lim
n→∞
µn = µ, and
x ∈ F (µn) for all n ∈ N, then x ∈ F (µ).
Statement (UHC1) is sometimes described as the “overwhelming majority” property. Heuris-
tically, the profile  ν+(1−)µ represents a mixture of two populations: a small “minority”
described by the profile ν, and a large “majority” represented by the profile µ. Statement
(UHC1) says that, if the majority is large enough, then its view determines the group
view (except that the minority can perhaps act as a “tie-breaker” in some cases). State-
ment (UHC2) means that the outcome of judgement aggregation is robust under small
13In general, the vector φ (µ˜) need not realizable in terms of an actual profile ν ∈ ∆(X ). However, in
a significant class of interesting judgement spaces, —the McGarvey spaces —the vector φ (µ˜) is always
equal to the vector of margins ν˜ associated with some profile ν ∈ ∆(X ), possibly after multiplication by
a positive scalar (Nehring and Pivato, 2011).
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measurement errors or perturbations of public opinion.14 The proof of the next result is
straightforward.
Proposition 3.5 Let φ : [−1, 1]−→R be any continuous, real-valued gain function. Then
for every judgement space X , the rule Fφ is upper hemicontinuous on ∆(X ).
4 Characterization of additive majority rules
The Decomposition Axiom. In order to provide a normative foundation for the class
of additive majority rules, a second normative axiom besides SME is needed. It applies to
situations in which judgement spaces can be decomposed into independent subspaces. Let
K1 and K2 be disjoint sets, and let K := K1 unionsq K2. Let X1 ⊆ {±1}K1 , let X2 ⊆ {±1}K2
and let X := X1 × X2 ⊆ {±1}K. If x ∈ X , then we write x = (x1,x2) where xn ∈ Xn for
n = 1, 2. For any µ ∈ ∆(X ), let µ(1) ∈ ∆(X1) be the marginal profile of µ on X1. That is:
for all x1 ∈ X1, µ(1)(x1) :=
∑
x2∈X2
µ(x1,x2). (10)
Likewise, define µ(2) ∈ ∆(X2). (Observe that µ˜ = (µ˜(1), µ˜(2)), because µ˜(1)k = µ˜k for all
k ∈ K1 and µ˜(2)k = µ˜k for all k ∈ K2.)
Let X be a collection of judgement spaces. We say X is closed under Cartesian products
if, for any X ,Y ∈ X, we also have X × Y ∈ X. (For an example, let X be the set of all
judgement spaces.) Let F be a judgement aggregation rule on ∆(X) (so F (X , µ) ⊆ X for
any X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆(X )). Consider the following axiom.
Axiom 2 (Decomposition) F is decomposable if, for all X1,X2 ∈ X and all µ ∈ ∆(X1×
X2), we have F (X1 ×X2, µ) = F (X1, µ(1))× F (X2, µ(2)).
Decomposition appears compelling as a requirement on majoritarian aggregation, es-
pecially if majoritarianism is is interpreted as looking for the “most representative” view.
Indeed, it seems eminently sensible to say that a view on a set of logically independent is-
sues (reflected in a Cartesian product) is most representative overall if and only if it is made
up views on the independent constituent issues that themselves are most representative of
voters’ views on these subissues.
To take the simplest example, consider a hypercube X = {±1}K, reflecting a set of K
logically independent yes-no issues. If F coincides with majority voting over binary issues
{±1}k, then Decomposition implies that F coincides with issue-wise majority voting over
the entire hypercube. Note, though, that this is simple, normatively appealing conclusion
is entailed here by SME already.
To illustrate the additional force of the Decomposition axiom beyond SME, consider
two distinct judgement spaces X and Y , and suppose that the aggregation in X and Y is
based on additive majority rules with distinct gain functions φ and ψ, respectively. If F is
14Note that a nontrivial judgement aggregation rule can never be lower hemicontinuous (because it is a
nonconstant function from ∆(X ) into a discrete set).
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decomposable, then F may need to violate SME on X × Y , essentially because F would
trade off supermajorities of different sizes on X and on Y in an inconsistent manner.
Fixed Population, Fixed Judgment Space. We shall first present a basic version of
the main result of the paper, an (almost-)characterization of the class of additive majority
rules for the case of a fixed finite population of voters and a fixed judgement space X . To
apply the Decomposition axiom, we need to consider the aggregation on X itself together
with its finite Cartesian powers representing, for example, repetitions of the same type of
aggregation problem with different profiles.
For any judgement space X , and any M ∈ N, let XM := X ×X ×· · ·×X be the M -fold
Cartesian product of X . Let 〈X 〉 := {XM ; M ∈ N}. (Thus, 〈X 〉 is closed under Cartesian
products.) Let F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X be a judgement aggregation rule. For all M ∈ N, define
the rule FM : ∆(XM)⇒ XM as follows:
FM(µ) := F (µ(1))× F (µ(2))× · · · × F (µ(M)), for all µ ∈ ∆(XM). (11)
Here, µ(1), . . . , µ(M) ∈ ∆(X ) are the marginal profiles of µ onto the M copies of X which
comprise XM . If we define ∆〈X 〉 := ⋃∞M=1 ∆(XM), then we obtain a decomposable ag-
gregation rule F ∗ : ∆〈X 〉 ⇒ ⋃∞M=1XM . Indeed, F ∗ is the unique extension of F to a
decomposable rule on ∆〈X 〉.
Now, fix N ∈ N. Let ∆N〈X 〉 be the set of all profiles on 〈X 〉 involving exactly N
equally weighted voters. If µ ∈ ∆N(XM), then µ(1), . . . , µ(M) ∈ ∆N(X ). Thus, for any
judgement aggregation rule F : ∆N(X )⇒ X , we can extend F to a decomposable rule F ∗
on ∆N〈X 〉 by applying equation (11).
We say that F is extended supermajority efficient (or ESME) if FM is supermajority
efficient on ∆N(XM) for every M ∈ N. Let G : ∆N(X )⇒ X be another aggregation rule;
we say G covers F if FM(µ) ⊆ GM(µ) for all M ∈ N and µ ∈ ∆N(XM).
Theorem 4.1 Let N ∈ N be a finite number of voters, let X be a judgement space, and
let F : ∆N(X ) ⇒ X be a judgement aggregation rule. Then the rule F is ESME if and
only if F is covered by an additive majority rule G : ∆N(X )⇒ X
Furthermore, we can choose G to be “minimal” in the following sense: if H is any
other additive majority rule which covers F , then H also covers G. This minimal covering
rule G is unique.
Finally, any additive majority rule G on ∆N〈X 〉 has a real-valued representation.
Theorem 4.1 associates with any ESME rule a unique additive majority rule G that
minimally covers F . This minimal cover can be seen as the closest approximation to F
which can be justified by a “systematic” way of trading off between conflicting majorities
(as described by the gain function φ). Thus, additive majority rules can be viewed as the
systematic part of ESME rules.
The key steps in the proof of Theorem 4.1 are roughly as follows. For any M ∈ N,
µ ∈ ∆N(XM), and x ∈ X , the function γµ,x can be represented as a vector gµ,x ∈ RN . Let
P be the closure of the set {(gx,µ−gy,µ)/M ; M ∈ N, µ ∈ ∆N(XM), x ∈ FM(XM , µ), and
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y ∈ XM}. First, using definition (11), we show that P is a compact, convex polyhedron
in RN . Second, using ESME, we show that P is disjoint from nonnegative orthant RN6− .
Third, using a slightly enhanced version of the Separating Hyperplane Theorem for finite
dimensional Euclidean spaces, we obtain a strictly positive vector v ∈ RN+ which separates
P from RN6− . Finally, let QN := {1 − 2 kN ; k ∈ [0 . . . N ]} (equivalently: QN = {µ˜k; k ∈ K
and µ ∈ ∆N〈X 〉}). We use v to define an odd, increasing function φ : QN−→R such that
Fφ covers F . Now let G = Fφ. A bit of fine-tuning of φ ensures that G is the unique
minimal cover.15 The existence of a real-valued representation in the absence of further
assumptions is obtained as a consequence of Hahn’s embedding theorem for linearly ordered
abelian groups.
Variable Population, Variable Judgment Space. If N is fixed in advance, and all
voters have equal weight, then Theorem 4.1 is adequate for most purposes. Proposition
C.1 (in Appendix C) extends Theorem 4.1 to a fixed population of voters having fixed,
distinct weights (reflecting, for example, varying levels of expertise); in this case, F need
only be defined on the subset ∆ω(X ) ⊂ ∆(X ) of profiles which could be produced by
these weights. However, if the number N of voters or the weights of individual voters are
allowed to vary, then F must be well-defined on all of ∆(X ). Also, Theorem 4.1 only
states that F is covered by G; if we want to ensure that F = G, we must also require upper
hemicontinuity, which only makes sense if F is defined on a dense subset of ∆(X ). Finally,
we may wish to consider rules defined on a larger collection judgement spaces —not just
the set of Cartesian powers of one space X .
Let X be a collection of judgement spaces. Given two aggregation rules F and G on
∆(X), we say that G covers F if F (X , µ) ⊆ G(X , µ) for any X ∈ X and any µ ∈ ∆(X ).
We now come to our second main result.
Theorem 4.2 Let X be any set of judgement spaces which is closed under Cartesian prod-
ucts.
(a) Any additive majority rule is supermajority efficient and decomposable on X.
Now let F be an aggregation rule satisfying Decomposition on X.
(b) F is SME on ∆(X) if and only if F is covered by an additive majority rule G
(with a hyperreal gain function). Furthermore, for all X ∈ X, there is a dense open
subset O ⊆ ∆(X ) such that F (X , µ) = G(X , µ) and is single-valued for all µ ∈ O.
(c) G can be chosen (uniquely) to be “minimal” in the following sense: if H is any
other additive majority rule which covers F , then H also covers G. This minimal
covering rule G is unique.
Finally, let F be a upper hemicontinuous aggregation rule on X. Then:
(d) F is an additive majority rule if and only if F is SME and decomposable.
15Note: although G is unique, the gain function φ which defines G is not unique. Also, φ is only defined
on the set QN —not on all of [−1, 1].
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Theorem 4.2 offers two significant enhancements to Theorem 4.1. First, we now have
F (X , µ) = G(X , µ) (rather than merely F (X , µ) ⊆ G(X , µ)) for generic µ ∈ ∆(X ). Sec-
ond, with the auxiliary condition of upper hemicontinuity, Theorem 4.2 provides an exact
characterization of the class of additive majority rules.
To illustrate the meaning of Theorem 4.2 and to explain how it is derived from Theorem
4.1, it will be helpful to state a simpler, intermediate version of the same result in a
setting with a variable population but a fixed judgment space. The proof sketch of this
intermediate result shows how the hyperreal-valued representation in a variable-population
setting emerges constructively from the real-valued representation in the fixed-population
setting of Theorem 4.1. It also shows that Theorem 4.2 does not depend on the use of
irrational profiles in ∆(X), or use any richness assumptions about the collection X. Fix a
judgement space X . Define
∆Q(X ) :=
∞⋃
N=1
∆N(X ) ⊂ ∆(X ) and Q :=
∞⋃
N=1
QN = Q ∩ [−1, 1].
Proposition 4.3 Let F : ∆Q(X )⇒ X be a judgement aggregation rule.
(a) F is ESME on ∆Q〈X 〉 if and only if there is gain function φ : Q−→∗R such that
F n(µ) ⊆ Fφ(X n, µ) for all n ∈ N and µ ∈ ∆Q(X n).
In this case, for all n ∈ N, there is a dense, relatively open subset On ⊆ ∆Q(X n)
such that F n(µ) = Fφ(X n, µ) and is single-valued for all µ ∈ On.
(b) Let F and φ be as in part (a), and let n ∈ N. If F n is upper hemicontinuous on
∆Q(X n), then F n(µ) = Fφ(X n, µ) for all µ ∈ ∆Q(X n).
Proof sketch. Let RN be the set of all real-valued, N-indexed sequences. A hyperreal
number corresponds to an equivalence class of elements of RN, where two sequences are
deemed equivalent if they agree “almost everywhere” (see Appendix A). For every N ∈ N,
Theorem 4.1 yields an increasing function φN : QN−→R such that F n(µ) ⊆ FφN (X n, µ)
for all n ∈ N and µ ∈ ∆N(X n). For each N , we extend φN to an odd, increasing function
φN : Q−→R in some arbitrary way. We now have an N-indexed sequence (φN)N∈N of
real-valued functions on Q. Equivalently, it may be viewed as a single, RN-valued function
φ̂. For every q ∈ Q, let φ(q) ∈ ∗R be the almost-everywhere equivalence class of the
sequence φ̂(q) ∈ RN; this yields a function φ : Q−→∗R. It can be checked that φ is odd
and increasing (because each φN was odd and increasing), and F
n(µ) ⊆ Fφ(X n, µ) for all
µ ∈ ∆Q(X n) (because F n(µ) ⊆ FφN (X n, µ) for all µ ∈ ∆N(X n)). Proposition 3.4(b) yields
a dense, relatively open domain On ⊆ ∆Q(X n) where Fφ is single-valued. Any µ ∈ ∆Q(X n)
can be approximated with elements from On; by invoking upper hemicontinuity, we can
then establish F n(µ) = Fφ(X n, µ).
To illustrate the construction of the hyperreal representation in a specific example,
suppose F was the Leximax rule (8). Then for each N ∈ N, it suffices to define φN(q) :=
sign(q) · |q|dN for some sufficiently large dN ∈ R+, to obtain an additive majority rule which
covers F on ∆N〈X 〉. Let φ(q) := sign(q) · |q|∗d, where ∗d ∈ ∗R is the almost-everywhere
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equivalence class of the sequence (dN)N∈N. It is easy to see that limN→∞ dN = ∞; thus,
∗d is an infinite hyperreal. It follows that Fφ is the Leximax rule.16
Properties of the Gain-Function: Uniqueness, Real-Valuedness and Continuity.
The preceeding results raise three issues. The proof sketch of Proposition 4.3 makes clear
how hyperreal gain functions enter the picture. But a real-valued gain function would
certainly be preferable. By analogy with Myerson (1995), we might expect upper hemi-
continuity to be sufficient to guarantee that φ is real-valued. But this turns out to be
false; there are uhc additive majority rules which do not admit real-valued gain functions.
This also explains why the two-stage proof strategy is necessary in Theorem 4.2; it is not
possible to use an infinite-dimensional “separating hyperplane” strategy to directly obtain
an additive majority representation of F on all of ∆(X).17
A second issue raised by Theorem 4.2 is the uniqueness of the gain function φ. This
turns out to be quite subtle; in general, φ can be made unique up to positive scalar
multiplication, but only on a subset of [−1, 1], and only if φ is real-valued. Further, even
this degree of uniqueness is obtainable only for certain kinds of judgment spaces, not all,
as it hinges on a sufficient degree of multiplicity in the SME views at some profiles. But,
in an important class of spaces studied in section 6, SME efficiency alone determines the
group view essentially uniquely at all profiles. Hence, in those spaces, all additive majority
rules end up selecting exactly the same views; see Proposition 6.2 below.
A third issue is to find conditions on φ which are necessary for Fφ to be upper hemicon-
tinuous. Proposition 3.5 provides one sufficient condition. But the converse of Proposition
3.5 turns out to be false; the question of upper hemicontinuity is also quite subtle. The
issues of upper hemicontinuity, uniqueness, and real-valuedness are all addressed the com-
panion paper Nehring and Pivato (2012a).
Generality of the Hyperreal Representation. While Theorem 4.2 provides strong
grounds for focusing on gain-functions with a hyperreal representation, it does not show
their full generality, since it does not provide an exact characterization in the general
case, only a unique minimal cover. It thus leaves room for additive majority rules with
yet more general representations based on more general co-domains; the most general
such representation would be that of a linearly ordered abelain group. However, the next
result shows that this level of generality is unnecessary. Hyperreal-valued gain function
are sufficient to represent any additive majority rule.
16Proof. For any r, s ∈ [0, 1], if r > s, then the ratio r∗ω/s∗ω is infinite (because it must be larger than
(r/s)N for any N ∈ N). Thus, if x,y ∈ X and x 
µ
y, then φ(µ˜) • x > φ(µ˜) • y; hence y 6∈ Fφ(µ). This
shows that Fφ(µ) ⊆ Leximax (X , µ). On the other hand, for any x,y ∈ Leximax (X , µ), we must have
x ≈
µ
y, which means γµ,x = γµ,y, which means x • φ(µ˜) = y • φ(µ˜). Thus Fφ(µ) = Leximax (X , µ).
17With an infinite-dimensional separating hyerplane argument analogous to the one used in the proof of
Theorem 4.1, we can construct a function φ : [−1, 1]−→R such that Fφ covers F . However, in general, this
φ will not be strictly increasing, so Fφ will not, in general, be SME itself. Indeed, in extreme cases (e.g.
F =Leximax), φ may be constant on almost all of [−1, 1], which means that generally Fφ(X , µ) = X , so
that the “covering” of F by Fφ is trivial and useless.
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Proposition 4.4 Let L be any linearly ordered abelian group, and let ψ : [−1, 1]−→L
be any gain function. Then there exists a hyperreal field ∗R and a gain function φ :
[−1, 1]−→∗R such that, for any judgement problem (X , µ), we have Fφ(X , µ) = Fψ(X , µ).
The proof of Proposition 4.4 uses the same argument for the existence of a real-valued
representation in the finite population setting as was used in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
However, now we must “glue together” many such real-valued representations; the outcome
is a hyperreal-valued representation.
5 Implications for Individual Profiles
What are the implications of the totality of additive majority rules for judgement aggrega-
tion at a particular profile? In other words, for a given space X and profile µ, which views
in X would be chosen by some additive majority rule? One may be inclined to conjecture
that these must be exactly the supermajority efficient views, but this need not be correct
as it misses the potential indirect restrictions imposed by Decomposition.
To characterize these restrictions, let (X , µ) be a judgement aggregation problem, and
let x ∈ X . For any M ∈ N, let xM := (x,x, . . . ,x) ∈ XM , and let νM ∈ ∆(XM) denote
some profile such that ν
(1)
M = · · · = ν(M)M = µ. We say that x is strongly supermajority
efficient (SSME) in (X , µ) if xM ∈ SME (XM , νM) for all M ∈ N. In other words, x
remains supermajority efficient even under arbitrary “replication” of the original judgement
aggregation problem. This replication can be interpreted in two ways.
First, we might regard [1 . . .M ] as a sequence of times, and suppose we encounter the
same judgement aggregation problem M times in a row. Then x is SSME if x is optimal
not only as a solution for one of these problems in isolation, but as a solution for the whole
sequence; it is not possible to surpass x through some strategy which alternates between
two or more elements of X .
Second, we might regard [1 . . .M ] as a set of possible states of nature. In this case,
an element (y1, . . . ,yM) ∈ XM represents a “randomized” view, which obtains the value
ym if state m occurs. Then x is SSME if it is not possible to surpass x through some
randomized view.
Let SSME (X , µ) be the set of SSME elements in X . The following result collects a few
basic facts about SSME as a refinement of SME.
Proposition 5.1 For any judgement space X and µ ∈ ∆(X ), we have ∅ 6= SSME (X , µ) ⊆
SME (X , µ) ⊆ Cond (X , µ). If Maj(µ) ∩ X 6= ∅, then SSME (X , µ) = SME (X , µ) =
Cond (X , µ) = Maj(µ) ∩ X .
Recall that Theorem 4.2 says that any SME rule satisfying decomposition is essentially
an additive majority rule. The next result is a similar statement at the level of individual
views; it says that any element of SSME (X , µ) can be obtained as the output of some
additive majority rule
Proposition 5.2 Let (X , µ) be a judgement aggregation problem, and let x ∈ X .
21
(a) The following are equivalent.
[i] x ∈ SSME (X , µ).
[ii] x ∈ Fφ(X , µ) for some gain function φ.
[iii] x ∈ Fφ(X , µ) for some real-valued, continuous gain function φ.
(b) Furthermore, for any x,y ∈ SSME (X , µ), if γx,µ 6= γy,µ, then φ can be chosen in
part (a)[iii] such that x ∈ Fφ(X , µ) but y 6∈ Fφ(X , µ).
We say that a judgement space X is neat if the SME and SSME views always coincide;
in view of Proposition 5.2, a space is neat if supermajority efficient views can always
be obtained as the output of some additive majority rule. In view of Proposition 5.1,
one class of neat spaces are the median spaces, which are exactly those spaces in which
the propositionwise majority view Maj(µ) is always consistent; see Nehring and Puppe
(2007, 2010).18 Since SSME is a refinement of SME, it is also clear that spaces in which
SME is essentially unique will also be neat; such “supermajority-determinate” spaces are
characterized in Section 6 below.
On the other hand, some spaces are not neat. For example, spaces of equivalence
relations are not neat, provided that they are sufficiently large. To be precise, let A be
a finite set, and let K be the set of all cardinality-2 subsets of A. For any equivalence
relation “∼” on A, we define the element x∼ ∈ {±1}K by setting x∼{i,j} := 1 if i ∼ j, while
x∼{i,j} := −1 if i 6∼ j, for all i, j ∈ A. Let X eqA := {x∼; “∼” is any equivalence relation on
A}.
Proposition 5.3 For any set A, if |A| ≥ 8, then X eqA is not neat.
6 Supermajority determinacy
We say that a judgement aggregation problem (X , µ) is majority determinate if, for any
x,y ∈ Cond (X , µ), we have x ≡
µ
y. Clearly, this occurs if and only if Maj(µ) ∩ X 6= ∅
—i.e. if the profile µ is “Condorcet consistent”. Condorcet consistency and majority
determinacy of profiles have been studied by Dietrich and List (2010), Pivato (2009), and
Nehring et al. (2011). A judgement space X is majority determinate if every µ ∈ ∆ (X )
is majority determinate. The majority determinate spaces have been characterized by
Nehring et al. (2011), adapting Nehring and Puppe (2007), as coinciding with the median
spaces. Examples of median spaces are views ordered as points on a line, and single-peaked
preference relations over alternatives ordered as points on a line (Black, 1948; Arrow, 1963).
We say that a judgement aggregation problem (X , µ) is supermajority determinate if,
for any x,y ∈ SME (X , µ), we have x ≡
µ
y. Typically, this means that SME (X , µ) is a
singleton (because typically, x 6≡
µ
y whenever x 6= y). A judgement space X is superma-
jority determinate if every µ ∈ ∆ (X ) is supermajority determinate. Since supermajority
18In the present setting, a median space can be defined as follows. For any x,y, z ∈ {±1}K, let
med(x,y, z) denote the unique view w in {±1}K such that, for all k ∈ K, we have wk = 1 iff xk+yk+zk ≥ 1.
Then X is a median space if, for all x,y, z ∈ X , we have med(x,y, z) ∈ X .
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dominance (unlike majority dominance) exploits the different strengths of supermajorities
on different propositions, supermajority determinacy is a weaker, more broadly applicable
requirement than majority determinacy.
For example, call a profile µ barely Condorcet inconsistent if it is Condorcet inconsistent
and, for some ` ∈ K, there exists x ∈ X such that (i) µ˜k ·xk ≥ 0 for all k 6= `, and (ii) |µ˜`| ≤
|µ˜k| for all k 6= `. Since, at any such profile, any view must override the majority on some
proposition, and since that majority is smallest for the view x, one sees that x D
µ
y for all
y ∈ X ; thus any barely Condorcet inconsistent profile is supermajority determinate. At the
same time, barely Condorcet inconsistent profiles are not just majority indeterminate by
definition, but may be majority indeterminate in a rather dramatic fashion: the Condorcet
set may leave the resolution of every issue indeterminate, in that, for all k ∈ K, we have
{xk; x ∈ Cond (X , µ)} = {±1}.19
According to the following result, the barely Condorcet inconsistent profiles form a
kind of belt of supermajority determinate profiles around the majority determinate ones.
Generic profiles need to be sufficiently “far” from majority determinacy to be supermajority
indeterminate.
Proposition 6.1 Let µ and ν be generic profiles in ∆ (X ) such that µ is majority determi-
nate and ν is supermajority indeterminate. Then there exists an open interval T ⊂ (0, 1)
such that, for any t ∈ T , the profile t ν + (1− t)µ is barely Condorcet inconsistent, hence
supermajority determinate yet majority indeterminate.
Let MD(X ) ⊆ ∆(X ) be the set of majority determinate profiles, and let SD(X ) ⊆
∆(X ) be the set of supermajority determinate profiles. If X itself is not majority deter-
minate, then Proposition 6.1 implies that MD(X ) ( SD(X ) —indeed, the set SD(X ) \
MD(X ) has nonempty interior in ∆(X ).
In a supermajority determinate space, all profiles are supermajority determinate. In
such a space, majority rule under issue parity is canonically given by the SME criterion
itself. To establish this claim formally, we must invoke the following axiom, which is a
natural complement to supermajoritarian efficiency.
Axiom 3 (Supermajority Equivalence) An aggregation rule F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X satisfies
Supermajority Equivalence (SMEQ) if, for all µ ∈ ∆(X ) and all x,y ∈ X with x ≡
µ
y we
have x ∈ F (X , µ) if and only if y ∈ F (X , µ).
Thus, if the SME axiom says that the rule F cares primarily about the 
µ
-ranking of the
collective view, then SMEQ says that F cares only about the 
µ
-ranking. Note that any
additive majority rule satisfies SMEQ in any judgement aggregation problem. Normatively,
we could have included SMEQ in the characterizations of additive majority rules, but this
would not have added much. Here it adds just what is needed.
Proposition 6.2 Suppose X is a supermajority determinate judgement space, and F :
∆ (X )⇒ X is an aggregation rule. Then the following four conditions are equivalent:
19This property can be viewed as a discrete counterpart in judgement aggregation to the celebrated
“chaotic” nature of majority voting identified by McKelvey (1976, 1979). It is studied in more detail in
Nehring et al. (2011).
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(a) F is supermajority efficient and supermajority equivalent;
(b) F is supermajority efficient and upper hemicontinuous;
(c) F (µ) = SME (X , µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(X );
(d) F = Fφ for any gain function φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R.
Which spaces are supermajority determinate besides median spaces? We have seen one
example already in section 3: the 3-permutahedron, capturing preference aggregation over
three alternatives. (Indeed, in this space, every Condorcet inconsistent profile is barely
Condorcet inconsistent.) However, our general characterization of supermajority-spaces
relies on the following condition of “friendliness” . We say that X is friendly if, for any
x,y ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆(X ), if Median (X , µ) = {x,y}, then γµ,x = γµ,y. Here is the first main
result of this section.
Theorem 6.3 A judgement space is supermajority determinate if and only if it is friendly.
While simple to state, friendliness is not easy to interpret and may be difficult to check.
As we shall show momentarily, in typical cases it is equivalent to a more intuitive and often
easily checkable condition of “proximality”.
Recall that X ⊆ {±1}K ⊂ RK. Let C := conv(X ). Note that C = {µ˜; µ ∈ ∆(X )}
(by defining formula (2)). We say that X is thick if C has non-empty interior in RK. This
means that no coordinate of X can be expressed as an affine function of other coordi-
nates. Thickness is a mild nondegeneracy condition which is satisfied by most interesting
judgement spaces.
Note that C is a compact, convex polytope in RK, whose vertices are the elements of X .
For any x,y ∈ X , the line segment from x to y is an edge of C if and only if there exists
some “supporting” vector r ∈ RK such that r • x = r • y > r • z for all z ∈ X \ {x,y}.
We say {x,y} is an internal edge if it has a supporting vector r ∈ C; in this case, we write
“x IX y”. It is easy to see that x IX y if and only if there exists some µ ∈ ∆(X ) such that
Median (X , µ) = {x,y} (simply choose µ such that µ˜ ∈ C is a supporting vector for the
edge between x and y).
For any x,y ∈ X , let K±(x,y) := {k ∈ K ; xk 6= yk}. Let d(x,y) := |K±(x,y)| be the
Hamming distance from x to y. We say X is proximal if d(x,y) ≤ 2 for all x IX y ∈ X .
We now come to the second main result of this section.
Theorem 6.4 (a) If X is proximal, then X is friendly; hence X is supermajority
determinate.
(b) If X is thick and friendly, then X is proximal.
(c) Thus, if X is thick, then X is supermajority determinate if and only if it is
proximal.
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Examples of Proximality. To illustrate the content of Theorem 6.4, we will give a few
examples of supermajority determinacy due to proximality. First, if |K| = 3, then any
space X ⊆ {±1}K is supermajority determinate. To see this, first note that any judgment
space with two elements is majority determinate hence trivially supermajority-determinate.
On the other hand, if |X | ≥ 3, then X is proximal, and thus, supermajority determinate
by Theorem 6.4(a). (To see this, observe that d(x,y) ≤ 3 for all x,y ∈ {±1}K, and
d(x,y) = 3 if and only if x = −y, in which case clearly not x IX y.)
For another example of proximality, let K represent a set of “candidates”. Any x ∈
{±1}K represents a “committee” (where xk = 1 if and only if candidate k is on the
committee). Let |x| := #{k ∈ K; xk = 1} be the size of this committee. Let 0 ≤ I ≤
J ≤ K, and let X comI,J := {x ∈ {±1}K; I ≤ |x| ≤ J}. Thus, X comI,J represents the set of
committees drawn from K, containing at least I members and at most J members.
Proposition 6.5 X comI,J is proximal, and thus, supermajority determinate.
In the committee problem X comI,J , the content of SME is very transparent. If the issue-
wise majority Maj(µ) constitutes a feasible committee, then elect it. If not —for example,
if less than I candidates are approved by a majority of votes —then elect the I candi-
dates with the largest number of votes (if necessary, one can arbitrarily break ties among
candidates with equal votes).
For yet another example of proximality, fix M,D ∈ N, and consider the D-dimensional
“discrete simplex” 4DM := {x ∈ [0...M ]D;
∑D
d=1 xd = M}. Any element x ∈ 4DM can be
represented by a unique point x˜ ∈ {±1}D×M defined as follows:
for all (d,m) ∈ [1...D]× [1...M ], x˜(d,m) :=
{
1 if xd ≥ m;
−1 if xd < m. (12)
Let X4D,M := {x˜; x ∈ 4DM} ⊂ {±1}D×M . Judgement aggregation over X4D,M represents
the allocation of a budget of M dollars towards D claimants by voting “yes” or “no”
to propositions of the form “xd should be at least m dollars” for each d ∈ [1...D] and
m ∈ [1...M ]; see Lindner et al. (2010).
Proposition 6.6 X4D,M is proximal, and thus, supermajority determinate.
Roughly speaking, the proof strategy for Theorem 6.4(a) is this: if x IX y, and d(x,y) ≤
2, then x and y are always D
µ
-comparable. Thus, if X is proximal, then it is possible to
compute SME (X , µ) through a process of gradient ascent, which converges to the set of
globally D
µ
-maximal elements. For example, in the case of X comI,J and X4D,M , we can always
move from one committee (or allocation) to a D
µ
-superior committee (allocation) by ex-
changing a single candidate (claimant-dollar) favoured by a smaller majority for a candidate
(claimant-dollar) favoured by a larger majority. Iterating this process yields a supermajor-
ity efficient committee (allocation). Moreover, any two committees (allocations) reached
by this process must be Dµ-comparable. Hence X must be supermajority-determinate.
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Counterexamples to Proximality. Proximality is clearly a rather restrictive condition,
which many thick judgement spaces fail to satisfy. Hence, supermajority efficiency is often
not a decisive criterion in judgement aggregation, and it will matter which additive majority
rule is adopted.
For example, we say X is a McGarvey space if 0 ∈ int (C).20 In this case, every edge of
the polytope C is internal. Any McGarvey space is thick (because int (C) 6= ∅ by definition),
so Theorem 6.4(b) says that X is supermajority determinate if and only if all edges of the
polytope C connect vertices of distance 1 or 2 —a condition met by few polytopes, hence
by few McGarvey spaces. Among the rare examples are the hypercubes {±1}K among
median spaces, and the committee spaces X comI,J with I < K2 < J . In contrast, important
examples of non-proximal McGarvey spaces are the spaces of linear orders and equivalence
relations, according to our next result.
Proposition 6.7 If |A| ≥ 4, then
(a) X prA is not proximal, hence not supermajority determinate.
(b) X eqA is not proximal, hence not supermajority determinate.
Part (b) can be verified by applying the following simple combinatorial criterion for non-
proximality. Two elements x, z ∈ X are adjacent if no other element of X is between them.21
Evidently, two adjacent elements must form an internal edge (although the converse need
not hold).22 Thus, Theorem 6.4(b) has the following consequence.
Corollary 6.8 If X is thick, and there exist any adjacent vertices x,y ∈ X with d(x,y) ≥
3, then X is not proximal, hence not supermajority determinate.
To apply this corollary in the case of equivalence relations, let x=(1, 1, ..., 1) representing
the relation where all objects are equivalent. Then d(x,y) ≥ |A| − 1 for all y 6= x. Thus
X eqA is non-proximal whenever |A| ≥ 4; this proves Proposition 6.7(b).
By contrast, Corollary 6.8 is not sufficient to establish Proposition 6.7(a). All adjacent
vertices in X prA have distance 1. Instead, we prove Proposition 6.7(a) in Appendix E by
constructing a (non-adjacent) internal edge of length 3.
Supermajority Determinacy without Proximality. Finally, to explain why the
“thick” hypothesis is required in Theorem 6.4(b), we will now construct an example of
a supermajority determinate space which is not proximal. Let S be an abstract finite set
with cardinality S := |S| ≥ 4. Let m be a natural number with 1 ≤ m ≤ S − 1, and let
K := {T ⊂ S; |T | = m}; thus, |K| = ( S
m
)
. For any s ∈ S, define xs ∈ {±1}K as follows:
for all k ∈ K, set xsk := 1 if s ∈ k, while xsk := −1 if s 6∈ k (recall that k is a subset of S).
20In other words, X is McGarvey space if, for any every view x ∈ {±1}K, we have x = Maj(µ) for some
profile µ ∈ ∆(X ). Nehring and Pivato (2011) provides many examples of such spaces.
21Another element y ∈ X is between x and z if, for all k ∈ K, we have (xk = zk) =⇒ (xk = yk = zk).
22Proof. If c := (x+z)/2, then c ∈ C, and Median (X , c) = {all elements of X between x and z}. Thus,
if x is adjacent to z, then Median (X , c) = {x, z}, so c supports the edge between x and z.
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Let X := {xs; s ∈ S}; then X is supermajority determinate. Indeed, for any µ ∈ ∆(X ),
the set SME (X , µ) corresponds to the outcome of the plurality rule, namely argmax
x∈X
µ(x).
(See Proposition E.2 in Appendix E.)
On the other hand, X is thick if and only if m = 1 or m = S − 1. In these cases, X
is easily verified to be proximal. However, if S ≥ 4 and 1 < m < S − 1, then X is not
proximal. Indeed, for any distinct s, t ∈ S, we have
d(xs,xt) = #{k ∈ K ; s ∈ k & t 6∈ k}+#{k ∈ K ; s 6∈ k & t ∈ k} = 2 ·
(
S − 2
m− 1
)
> 2,
Extending this example, let K := 2S , to be interpreted as the “universal aggregation
space”. Then define xs as above, for any s ∈ S, and let X univ := {xs : s ∈ S}. Then again
SME
(X univ, µ) is the outcome of the plurality rule, so X univ is supermajority determinate.
It is not proximal, since, for any distinct s, t ∈ S, d(xs,xt) = 2S−1. Conceptually, the
elements of X univ can be viewed as (atomic) “worlds”, and the elements of K as correspond-
ing to all logically conceivable “propositions” (equated here with sets of possible worlds).
X univ can be viewed as a universal judgement space in that no conceivable proposition is
ruled out. If that lack of distinction is viewed as a limiting/default case, then, by Proposi-
tion E.2, plurality rule is supported as the “default” majority rule.23 Of course, it is very
special (and degenerate) to treat all conceivable propositions on par.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced supermajority efficiency as a fundamental criterion of
majoritarianism in judgement aggregation. In an interesting class of judgement spaces,
supermajority efficiency alone determines the outcome. In other spaces, there exist profiles
for which this criterion is indeterminate. This indeterminacy can be resolved by application
of additive majority rules . We have identified the additive majority rules as the only rules
that are supermajority efficient and “decomposable”.
Are Supermajority Efficiency and Decomposition exhaustive, or are there additional
normative considerations to further pin down the meaning of majoritarianism as equal
representation? If so, how do such considerations constrain the selection of the particular
additive majority rule Fφ?
We believe that there are such criteria, but they do not all pull in one direction;
substantial work remains to be done. A central place in these investigations will surely be
played by the simplest such rule, the median rule, where the support of a view is measured
simply as the overall sum of votes across all issues. A normative, axiomatic foundation of
this rule is provided in the companion paper (Nehring and Pivato, 2012b). A broader look
is undertaken in further work in progress (Nehring and Pivato, 2012a).
23“Universality” of X univ holds also in the sense that any clone-free judgement space can be viewed as
a coarsening of X univ as follows. A space X is clone-free if, for all k, ` ∈ K, xk 6= x` for some x∈X . For
any clone-free judgement space X , let X univ be the universal space associated with S = X . Then there is
a subset L ⊆ K := 2X such that X is isomorphic to {yL : y∈X univ}.
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Appendices
A Hyperreal fields
In classical mathematics, infinity is treated as a “nonarithmetic” object, and the word “in-
finitesimal” is merely a figure of speech. However, it is possible to construct a well-defined
and well-behaved arithmetic of infinite and infinitesimal quantities, using a hyperreal field.
Roughly speaking, this is is an arithmetic structure ∗R which is obtained by adding a
large collection of “infinite” and “infinitesimal” quantities to the set of real numbers. The
important properties of ∗R are as follows:
1. ∗R is a field. This means that ∗R has binary operations “+” and “·”, and distinguished
“identity” elements 0 and 1 such that:
(a) (∗R,+, 0) is an abelian group, and (∗R \ {0}, ·, 1) is an abelian group.
(b) For all r, s, t ∈ ∗R, we have r · (s+ t) = r · s+ r · t.
2. There is an “exponentiation” operation, which behaves as one would expect. In
particular, for all r, s, t ∈ ∗R, we have r0 = 1, r1 = r, r−1 = 1/r, rs+t = rs · rt, and
(r · s)t = rt · st.
3. ∗R has a linear order relation > (i.e. transitive, complete, and antisymmetric).
4. For any r, s ∈ ∗R, if r > 0, then r + s > s. If r > 1, and s > 0, then r · s > s.
5. R ⊂ ∗R, and the arithmetic operations and order relation on ∗R extend the standard
arithmetic and ordering of R.
The field ∗R inherits many of the properties of R, but not all. For example, because
it contains infinite quantities, ∗R violates the Archimedean property of the real numbers.
Likewise, because ∗R contains infinitesimals, it is not order-complete: in general, subsets of
∗R do not have well-defined suprema and infima. Thus, much of the machinery of classical
real analysis breaks down in ∗R. The order topology of ∗R is not well-behaved; there are
no nontrivial continuous functions from R into ∗R. The study of hyperreal fields is the
starting point of nonstandard analysis; see Anderson (1991) or Goldblatt (1998) for more
information.
Ultrapower construction. The properties listed above are sufficient for a casual user
of ∗R. However, we will now also provide a formal construction of ∗R, that is central to the
proof of the main result of the paper, Theorem 4.2. Let I be any infinite indexing set. A
free filter on I is a collection F of subsets of I satisfying the following axioms:
(F0) No finite subset of I is an element of F. (In particular, ∅ 6∈ F.)
(F1) If E ,F ∈ F, then E ∩ F ∈ F.
(F2) For any F ∈ F and E ⊆ I, if F ⊆ E , then E ∈ F also.
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For any E ⊆ I, axioms (F0) and (F1) together imply that at most one of E or E{ := I \ E
can be in F. A free ultrafilter is filter F which also satisfies:
(UF) For any E ⊆ I, either E ∈ F or E{ ∈ F.
Equivalently, a free ultrafilter is a “maximal” free filter: it is not a proper subset of any
other free filter. Heuristically, elements of F are “large” subsets of I: if F ∈ F and a
certain statement holds for all i ∈ F , then this statement holds for “almost all” element
of I. In particular, axioms (F0) and (UF) imply that I ∈ F.
Ultrafilter lemma. Every free filter F is contained in some free ultrafilter.
Proof sketch. Consider the set of all free filters containing F; apply Zorn’s Lemma to get
a maximal element of this set. 2
Let F be a free ultrafilter on I, and let RI be the space of all functions r : I−→R. For all
r, s ∈ RI , define r ∼
F
s if the set {i ∈ I; r(i) = s(i)} is an element of F. Let ∗R := RI/( ∼
F
).
For any r ∈ RI , let ∗r denote the equivalence class of r in ∗R. For any r, s ∈ RI , we set(
∗r > ∗s
)
⇐⇒
(
the set {i ∈ I; r(i) > s(i)} is an element of F
)
. (A1)
This defines a linear order “>” on ∗R. Define the elements r + s, r · s, r/s, and rs in RI
by: (r + s)i := ri+si, (r · s)i := ri ·si, (r/s)i := ri/si, and (rs)i := rsii , for all i ∈ I. Then,
define ∗r + ∗s := ∗(r + s), ∗r · ∗s := ∗(r · s), ∗r/∗s := ∗(r/s), and ∗r∗s := ∗(rs). We can embed
R into ∗R by mapping any r ∈ R to the element ∗r in ∗R, where r := (r, r, r, . . .) ∈ RI .
Then (∗R,+, ·, >) is called an ultrapower of R; it is an ultrareal field in the sense defined
above.
B Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2. (a) Define φ̂(r) := φ(r)− φ(−r) for all r ∈ [−1, 1]. Then φ̂
is odd. Let x,y ∈ X . Recall that K±(x,y) := {k ∈ K ; xk 6= yk}. Then∑
k∈K
φ(xkµ˜k)−
∑
k∈K
φ(ykµ˜k) =
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
(
φ(xkµ˜k)− φ(ykµ˜k)
)
(∗)
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
(
φ(xkµ˜k)− φ(−xkµ˜k)
)
(†)
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
φ̂(xkµ˜k)
(‡)
1
2
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
(
φ̂(xkµ˜k)− φ̂ (−xkµ˜k)
)
(∗)
1
2
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
(
φ̂(xkµ˜k)− φ̂(ykµ˜k)
)
=
1
2
(∑
k∈K
φ̂(xkµ˜k)−
∑
k∈K
φ̂(ykµ˜k)
)
. (B1)
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Here (∗) is because yk = −xk for all k ∈ K±(x,y). Meanwhile (†) is simply the definition
of φ̂, and (‡) is because φ̂ is odd, so φ̂(r)− φ̂(−r) = 2φ̂(r).
Equation (B1) implies that(∑
k∈K
φ(xkµ˜k) ≥
∑
k∈K
φ(ykµ˜k)
)
⇐⇒
(∑
k∈K
φ̂(xkµ˜k) ≥
∑
k∈K
φ̂(ykµ˜k)
)
.
Thus, Fφ(X , µ) = Fφ̂(X , µ). 2
Proof of Corollary 3.3. (a) The second equality follows immediately from the first,
because xkµ˜k > 0 if and only if k ∈ M(x, µ). To see the first equality, define ψ(r) :=
φ(r+) for all r ∈ [−1, 1]. Then φ(r) = ψ(r) − ψ(−r) for all r ∈ [−1, 1] (because φ
is odd). Thus, in the notation of Proposition 3.2, we have φ = ψ˜. Thus, Fφ = Fψ.
(Strictly speaking, ψ is only non-decreasing, rather than strictly increasing. But the
proof of Proposition 3.2 still works.)
(b) If φ is odd, then for any µ ∈ ∆(X ), x ∈ X , and k ∈ K, we have φ(xkµ˜k) = xkφ(µ˜k) (be-
cause xk = ±1). Thus,
∑
k∈K
φ(xk·µ˜k) =
∑
k∈K
xkφ(µ˜k) = x•φ(µ˜). Thus, argmax
x∈X
(∑
k∈K
φ(xk µ˜k)
)
=
argmax
x∈X
x • φ(µ˜). 2
Lemma B.1 Let X be a judgement space, and let F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X be a judgement aggre-
gation rule. If F is monotone, then F is generically single-valued on ∆(X ).
Proof: Define ∆∗(X ) := {µ ∈ ∆(X ); µ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X} (a dense subset of ∆(X )).
For any µ ∈ ∆∗(X ) and any y ∈ F (µ), define Oy(µ) := {µ′ ∈ ∆(X ); µ′(y) > µ(y) while
µ′(x) < µ(x), for all x ∈ X \{y}}. Then Oy(µ) 6= ∅ (because µ ∈ ∆∗(X )), and Oy(µ) is
an open subset of ∆(X ), and µ is a cluster point of Ox(µ). Furthermore, F (µ′) = {y}
for all µ′ ∈ Oy(µ) (because F is monotone). Thus, F is single-valued on Oy(µ).
Next, for any µ ∈ ∆∗(X ), define O(µ) :=
⋃
x∈F (µ)
Ox(µ). Then O(µ) is a nonempty
open subset of ∆(X ), and µ is a cluster point of O(µ) (because it is a union of one or
more nonempty open subsets of ∆(X ) clustering at µ). Finally, let O :=
⋃
µ∈∆∗(X )
O(µ).
Then O is an open subset of ∆(X ), and F is single-valued on O. Every element of
∆∗(X ) is a cluster point of O, and ∆∗(X ) is dense in ∆(X ); thus, O is dense in ∆(X ).
2
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Proof of Proposition 3.4 (a) Let µ ∈ ∆(X ) and y ∈ Fφ(µ). Let µ′ ∈ ∆(X ) be
more supportive than µ of y; we must show that Fφ(µ
′) = {y}. By negating certain
coordinates of X if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that y = 1.
Recall that X (µ) := {x ∈ X ; µ(x) > 0}. Define K1 := {k ∈ K; µ˜k = 1} = {k ∈ K;
xk = 1 for all x ∈ X (µ)}. Let K0 := K \ K1.
Claim 1: (a) For all k ∈ K, we have µ˜′k ≥ µ˜k. (b) If k ∈ K0 then µ˜′k > µ˜k.
Proof: If µ′ is more supportive than µ of y, then X (µ′) ⊆ X (µ). Let X− := {x ∈ X (µ);
xk = −1} and X+ := {x ∈ X (µ); x 6= y but xk = 1}. Then
(µ˜′k − µ˜k) ()
∑
x∈X (µ)
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
xk
=
(
µ′(y)− µ(y)
)
yk +
∑
x∈X−
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
xk +
∑
x∈X+
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
xk.
(†)
(
µ′(y)− µ(y)
)
−
∑
x∈X−
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
+
∑
x∈X+
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
≥
(∗)
(
µ′(y)− µ(y)
)
+
∑
x∈X−
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
+
∑
x∈X+
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
=
∑
x∈X (µ)
(
µ′(x)− µ(x)
)
= 1− 1 = 0,
and thus, µ˜′k ≥ µ˜k. Here, () is by defining equation (2), (†) is by definition of X−
and X+, and (∗) is because µ′(x)− µ(x) < 0 for all x ∈ X− by the definition of µ′.
If k ∈ K0, then X− 6= ∅, so (∗) becomes a strict inequality, so µ˜′k > µ˜k. 3 Claim 1
Now, let x ∈ X \ {y}; we will show that x 6∈ F (µ′). There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose K±(x,y) ⊆ K1. Then for all k ∈ K±(x,y), we have µ˜k = yk = 1,
while xk = −1. Thus,
(y − x) • φ(µ˜k) =
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
(yk − xk)φ(µ˜k) = 2 d(x,y) · φ(1) > 0.
Thus, y • φ(µ˜) > x • φ(µ˜), so x 6∈ Fφ(µ).
Case 2. Suppose K±(x,y) 6⊆ K1. For all k ∈ K±(x,y), we have yk = 1 and
xk = −1, while Claim 1(a) says µ˜′k ≥ µ˜k. Furthermore, K0 ∩ K±(x,y) 6= ∅, and for any
k ∈ K0 ∩ K±(x,y), Claim 1(b) says µ˜′k > µ˜k. Thus,
(y−x)•φ(µ˜′) =
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
2φ(µ˜′k) >
()
∑
k∈K±(x,y)
2φ(µ˜k) = (y−x)•φ(µ˜) ≥
(∗)
0,
and thus, x 6∈ Fφ(µ′). Here, () is because φ is increasing, and (∗) is because y ∈ Fφ(µ).
We conclude that x 6∈ Fφ(µ′) for all x ∈ X \ {y}; thus, F (µ˜′) = {y}, as desired.
(b) follows immediately from part (a) and Lemma B.1. 2
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C Proofs from Section 4
Theorem 4.1 is actually a special case of a more general result, that is also needed for
the proof of Theorem 4.2, and which we will state and prove in this appendix. A finitely
generated judgement monoid is a collection X = {Xm11 ×Xm22 ×· · ·×XmJJ ; m1, . . . ,mJ ∈ N},
where J ∈ N, and X1, . . . ,XJ are some fixed judgement spaces. For example 〈X 〉 := {X n;
n ∈ N} is a finitely generated judgement monoid.
A finitary weight function is a function ω : N−→R+ such that the set supp(ω) := {n ∈ N;
ω(n) > 0} is finite. (If |supp(ω)| = N , then ω represents a weight function for N voters.)
Let Ω be the set of all finitary weight functions. For any ω ∈ Ω, let ∆ω(X) be the set of
all profiles in ∆(X) generated using ω, in the sense of eqn.(1). Let Qω := {µ˜k; µ ∈ ∆ω(X)
and k ∈ K}. (For example, suppose N ∈ N, and let ω(n) := 1 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ] while
ω(0) := 1 for all n > N ; then ∆ω〈X 〉 = ∆N〈X 〉, as defined prior to Theorem 4.1.)
Proposition C.1 Let ω ∈ Ω, let X be a finitely generated judgement monoid, and let F
be a judgement aggregation rule on ∆ω(X) which satisfies the Decomposition axiom.
Then F is SME on ∆ω(X) if and only if there is a gain function φω : Qω−→R such
that F (X , µ) ⊆ Fφω(X , µ) for all X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆ω(X ).
Furthermore, we can choose Fφω to be “minimal” in the following sense: if H is any
other additive majority rule which covers F on ∆ω(X), then H also covers Fφω . This
minimal covering rule Fφω is unique.
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Finally, any additive majority rule G on ∆ω(X) has a real-valued representation.
The proof of Proposition C.1 requires seven preliminary lemmas. The first of these is
actually one half of Theorem 4.2(a).
Lemma C.2 Any additive majority rule is decomposable.
Proof: Let φ be any gain function, and let X1 and X2 be two judgement spaces. Let
X = X1×X2, let µ ∈ ∆(X ), and let µ1 and µ2 be the marginal projections of µ onto X1
and X2 respectively.
We must show that Fφ(X , µ) = Fφ(X1, µ1) × Fφ(X2, µ2). If x ∈ X , then x = (x1,x2)
for some x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2. Meanwhile, φ(µ˜) = (φ(µ˜1), φ(µ˜2)). Thus, φ(µ˜) • x =
φ(µ˜1) • x1 + φ(µ˜2) • x2. Thus,(
x ∈ Fφ(X , µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
φ(µ˜) • x ≥ φ(µ˜) • y for all y ∈ X
)
⇐⇒
(
φ(µ˜1) • x1 ≥ φ(µ˜1) • y1, ∀ y1 ∈ X1 and φ(µ˜2) • x2 ≥ φ(µ˜2) • y2, ∀ y2 ∈ X2
)
⇐⇒
(
x1 ∈ Fφ(X1, µ1) and x2 ∈ Fφ(X2, µ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
x ∈ Fφ(X1, µ1)× Fφ(X2, µ2)
)
,
as desired. 2
The next lemma is needed to establish the last statement of Proposition C.1. The con-
struction of the proof is also used in the proof of Proposition 4.4.
24However, the gain function φω which defines Fφω is not unique.
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Lemma C.3 Let (L,+, >) be a linearly ordered abelian group, and let ψ : [−1, 1]−→L be
a gain function. Let X be any finitely generated judgement monoid. For any ω ∈ Ω, there
exists a real-valued gain function φω : Qω−→R such that Fφω(X , µ) = Fψ(X , µ) for all
X ∈ X and all µ ∈ ∆ω(X ).
Proof: Suppose X is generated by X1, . . . ,XN . Thus, any X ∈ X has the form X = Xn1 ×
· · · × XnJ for some n1, . . . , nJ ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For any µ ∈ ∆ω(X ) and any j ∈ [1 . . . J ],
let µ(j) ∈ ∆ω(Xnj) be the jth marginal of µ. Then for any gain function φω : Qω−→R,
the Decomposition property of the rules Fψ and Fφω (from Lemma C.2) implies that
Fψ(X , µ) =
J∏
j=1
Fψ(Xnj , µ(j)) and Fφω(X , µ) =
J∏
j=1
Fφω(Xnj , µ(j)) (C1)
Thus, it suffices to construct φω such that Fφω(Xn, µ) = Fψ(Xn, µ) for all µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn)
and all n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
Hahn’s Embedding Theorem says there is an order-preserving group isomorphism
α : L−→L ⊂ RT , where T is a (possibly infinite) linearly ordered set, and the group
L is endowed with the T -lexicographical order, with smaller t-coordinates given lexi-
cographical priority over larger t coordinates. (In particular, this means that, for any
distinct `, `′ ∈ L, the set {t ∈ T ; `t 6= `′t} has a minimal element.)25
Now, for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], any µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn), and any x,y ∈ Xn, if x•ψ(µ) 6= y•ψ(µ),
then α [x • ψ(µ)] 6= α [y • ψ(µ)] (because α is injective), and thus, there exists some
tµx,y ∈ T such that α [x • ψ(µ)]tµx,y 6= α [y • ψ(µ)]tµx,y , while α [x • ψ(µ)]t = α [y • ψ(µ)]t
for all t < tµx,y. Since α is order-preserving and L is lexicographically ordered, this
implies that(
x • ψ(µ) > y • ψ(µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
α [x • ψ(µ)]tµx,y > α [y • ψ(µ)]tµx,y
)
. (C2)
Let T ′ := {tµx,y; n ∈ [1 . . . N ], µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn), and x,y ∈ Xn}. Then T ′ is finite, because
Xn and ∆ω(Xn) are finite for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Let <′ denote the linear order which T ′
inherits from T . For any t ∈ T ′, let |t| := #{t′ ∈ T ′; t′ <′ t}; thus, |t| ∈ N, because T ′
is finite. For any t1, t2 ∈ T ′, clearly (t1 < t2)⇔ (|t1| < |t2|).
Since L ⊂ RT , any ` ∈ L has the form ` = (`t)t∈T where `t ∈ R for all t ∈ T . Thus,
for any  > 0, we can define a group homomorphism β : L−→R by setting
β(`) :=
∑
t∈T ′
`t 
|t|, for all ` ∈ L. (C3)
Then define φ : Qω−→R by setting
φ(q) := β (α [ψ(q)]) =
∑
t∈T ′
α [ψ(q)]t 
|t|, for all q ∈ Qω. (C4)
25This technical remark is necessary because while T is linearly ordered, it may not be well-ordered, so
the “lexicographical order” is not necessarily well-defined on all of RT . But Hahn’s Embedding Theorem
ensures that it is well-defined on the sugroup L. See e.g. Hausner and Wendel (1952), Clifford (1954), or
Gravett (1956) for details.
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For any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we have Xn ⊆ {±1}Kn for some finite set Kn. Thus, for any
µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn), and x,y ∈ Xn, we have
x • φ(µ)− y • φ(µ) (∗)
∑
k∈Kn
xk β (α [ψ(µ˜k)])−
∑
k∈Kn
yk β (α [ψ(µ˜k)])
(†) β
(
α
[∑
k∈Kn
xk ψ(µ˜k)
])
− β
(
α
[∑
k∈Kn
yk ψ(µ˜k)
])
= β (α [x • ψ(µ)])− β (α [y • ψ(µ)])
()
(
α [x • ψ(µ)]tµx,y − α [y • ψ(µ)]tµx,y
)
|t
µ
x,y| +
(
a finite linear combination
of higher powers of 
)
.
(Here, (∗) is by equation (C4) and the definition of x • φ(µ). Next, (†) is because β
and α are both group homomorphisms, and xk, yk ∈ {±1} for all k ∈ Kn. Finally, ()
is by equation (C3) and the definition of tµx,y.) Thus, there exists some 
µ
x,y > 0 such
that, for any  ∈ (0, µx,y], statement (C2) entails(
x • ψ(µ) > y • ψ(µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
x • φ(µ) > y • φ(µ)
)
. (C5)
Now define  := min{µx,y; x,y ∈ Xn, µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn), and n ∈ [1 . . . N ]}. Then  > 0
because Xn and ∆ω(Xn) are finite for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Furthermore, for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ],
and any µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn), statement (C5) now holds for all x,y ∈ Xn. Thus, Corollary 3.3(b)
implies that
Fφ(µ) = Fψ(µ), for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn). (C6)
Now define φω := φ. Then combining statements (C1) and (C6), we deduce that
Fφω(X , µ) = Fψ(X , µ) for all X ∈ X and all µ ∈ ∆ω(X ), as desired. 2
The next lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 5.2 as well as that of Proposition C.1;
it is useful for separation arguments involving finite-dimensional polytopes. It strengthens
a well-known fact about Pareto optimality; finite-dimensionality of the underlying vector
space RQ is crucial for its validity. Fix Q ∈ N, and let RQ+ := {r ∈ RQ; rq ≥ 0, for all
q ∈ [1...Q]} be the non-negative orthant in RQ.
Lemma C.4 Let Q ∈ N. Let P ⊂ RQ be a closed, convex polytope in which 0 is Pareto
optimal (i.e. P ∩ RQ+ = {0}). Then there exists an all-positive vector v ∈ RQ+ such that
v • p ≤ 0 for all p ∈ P.
Proof: Let T := P − RQ+; then T is also a closed, convex polytope in RQ.
Claim 1: T ∩ RQ+ = {0}.
Proof: (by contradiction) If t ∈ T , then t = p − r for some p ∈ P and r ∈ RQ+. Thus
p = t + r. Thus, if t ∈ RQ+ \ {0}, then p ∈ RQ+ \ {0} also, contradicting the Pareto
optimality of 0. 3 Claim 1
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Thus, 0 lies on the boundary of the polytope T , so it is contained in some face. Let F
be the minimal-dimension face of T containing 0. Thus, if S ⊆ RQ is the linear subspace
spanned by F , then F = S ∩ T , and there exists some  > 0 such that B ∩ S ⊂ F ,
where B ⊂ RQ is the -ball around 0.
F is a face of T , so there exists some v ∈ RK such that F = argmaxt∈T (v•t). Clearly
v • 0 = 0; hence v • f = 0 for all f ∈ F , while v • t < 0 for all t ∈ T \ F . Thus, if
V ⊂ RQ is the hyperplane orthogonal to v, then F = T ∩ V .
Claim 2: v • r > 0 for all r ∈ RQ+ \ {0}.
Proof: For any r ∈ RQ+ \ {0}, we have −r ∈ T , so v • (−r) ≤ 0, so v • r ≥ 0. It remains
to show that v • r 6= 0. By contradiction, suppose v • r = 0. Then r ∈ V . Thus,
−r ∈ V . But −r ∈ T also, so −r ∈ T ∩ V = F = T ∩ S. But F contains a relative
neighbourhood around 0 in the subspace S, so if −r ∈ F , then there exists some  > 0
such that  r ∈ F ; hence  r ∈ T . But  r ∈ RQ+ \ {0}, so this contradicts Claim 1.
3 Claim 2
For any q ∈ [1...Q], let eq = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) be the qth unit vector. Then eq ∈ RQ+.
Thus, Claim 2 says that v • eq > 0. But this means that vq > 0, as desired. 2
Now, fix ω ∈ Ω. Let Q := Qω∩ [0, 1]; then RQ is a finite-dimensional vector space (because
Qω ⊂ [−1, 1] is a finite set). Let X be a judgement space, and let µ ∈ ∆(X ). For any
x ∈ X , we define g(x, µ) ∈ RQ by setting
gq(x, µ) :=
γµ,x(q)
|K| =
#{k ∈ K ; xk µ˜k ≥ q}
|K| , for all q ∈ Q. (C7)
We then define D(x;X , µ) := {g(y, µ)−g(x, µ); y ∈ X}, a subset of RQ. If F : ∆ω(X )⇒
X is a judgement aggregation rule, then define
Dω(F,X ) :=
⋃
µ∈∆ω(X )
⋃
x∈F (X ,µ)
D(x;X , µ) ⊆ RQ.
Finally, let X be a judgement monoid. If F is a judgement aggregation rule on ∆ω(X),
then define Dω(F,X) :=
⋃
X∈X
Dω(F,X ) ⊆ RQ.
Lemma C.5 F is SME on ∆ω(X) if and only if Dω(F,X) ∩ RQ+ = {0}.
Proof: For any X ∈ X, µ ∈ ∆ω(X ), and x ∈ X , we have(
x ∈ SME (X , µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
6 ∃ y ∈ X with gq(y, µ) ≥ gq(x, µ) for all q ∈ Q, and g(y, µ) 6= g(x, µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
(g(y, µ)− g(x, µ)) 6∈ RQ+ \ {0} for all y ∈ X
)
⇐⇒
(
D(x;X , µ) ∩ RQ+ = {0}
)
.
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Thus, F is supermajority efficient on ∆ω(X) if and only if D(x;X , µ) ∩ RQ+ = {0}
whenever x ∈ F (X , µ) for some (X , µ) ∈ ∆ω(X). The claim follows. 2
Let Pω(F,X) be the closure of Dω(F,X) in RQ.
Lemma C.6 Let X be a judgement monoid. Let ω ∈ Ω.
(a) If F is a judgement aggregation rule on ∆ω(X) which satisfies the axiom of De-
composition, then Pω(F,X) is a closed, convex subset of RQ.
(b) Also, if X is finitely generated, then Pω(F,X) is a convex polytope in RQ.
Proof: (a) For any (X , µ) ∈ ∆ω(X), define D(F,X , µ) :=
⋃
x∈F (X ,µ)
D(x;X , µ). Thus,
Dω(F,X ) =
⋃
µ∈∆ω(X )
Dω(F,X , µ). (C8)
Claim 1: Let X1,X2 ∈ X, and suppose X1 ⊆ {±1}K1 and X2 ⊆ {±1}K2 for some finite
sets K1,K2. If X := X1×X2, then X ⊆ {±1}K, where K := K1 unionsqK2. Let s1 := |K1|/|K|
and s2 := |K2|/|K| (so s1 + s2 = 1).
(a) For any µ1 ∈ ∆ω(X1) and µ2 ∈ ∆ω(X2), there exists a profile µ ∈ ∆ω(X ) such that
µ(1) = µ1 and µ
(2) = µ2.
(b) For any x = (x1,x2) ∈ X , we have g(x, µ) = s1 g(x1, µ(1)) + s2 g(x2, µ(2)).
(c) D(F,X , µ) = {s1 d1 + s2 d2; d1 ∈ D(F,X1, µ(1)) and d2 ∈ D(F,X2, µ(2))}.
Proof: (a) Suppose supp(ω) := [1 . . . N ] for some N ∈ N. Let y11,y12, . . . ,y1N ∈ X1
be such that µ1 is defined by applying equation (1) to this collection. Likewise,
let y21,y
2
2, . . . ,y
2
N ∈ X2 be such that µ2 is defined by applying equation (1) to this
collection. Now, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], define yn := (y1n,y2n) ∈ X . Define µ ∈ ∆(X ) by
applying equation (1) to the collection y1, . . . ,yN ∈ X . For any x1 ∈ X1, we have
µ(1)(x1)
(∗)
∑
x2∈X2
µ(x1,x2)
(†)
∑
x2∈X2
∑{
ω(n) ; n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and (y1n,y2n) = (x1,x2)
}
=
∑{
ω(n) ; n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and y1n = x1
}
(†) µ1(x
1).
Here (∗) is by equation (10), and both (†) are by equation (1). Thus, µ(1) = µ1.
Likewise, µ(2) = µ2.
(b) Note that µ˜ = (µ˜(1), µ˜(2)) ∈ RK. Thus, for both n ∈ {1, 2} and all k ∈ Kn, we have
xk · µ˜k = xnk · µ˜(n)k . Thus, for any q ∈ (0, 1], we have
{k ∈ K ; xk · µ˜k ≥ q} =
{
k ∈ K1 ; x1k · µ˜(1)k ≥ q
}
unionsq
{
k ∈ K2 ; x2k · µ˜(2)k ≥ q
}
.
Thus, |K| · gq(x, µ) = |{k ∈ K ; xk · µ˜k ≥ q}|
=
∣∣∣{k ∈ K1 ; x1k · µ˜(1)k ≥ q}∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣{k ∈ K2 ; x2k · µ˜(2)k ≥ q}∣∣∣
= |K1| · gq(x1, µ(1)) + |K2| · gq(x2, µ(2)).
now divide both sides by |K| and substitute defining equation (C7) to prove part (b).
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(c) Let x := (x1,x2) and y := (y1,y2) be elements of X . Thus, x1,y1 ∈ X1 and x2,y2 ∈
X2. If d = g(y, µ) − g(x, µ), and dn = g(yn, µ(n)) − g(xn, µ(n)) for n ∈ {1, 2}, then
part (b) implies that
d = g(y, µ)− g(x, µ) (C9)
= s1 g(y
1, µ(1))− s1 g(x1, µ(1)) + s2 g(y2, µ(2))− s2 g(x2, µ(2)) = s1 d1 + s2 d2.
But for any d ∈ RQ, we have:(
d ∈ D(F,X , µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
∃ x ∈ F (X , µ) and y ∈ X such that d = g(y, µ)− g(x, µ)
)
⇐
(∗)⇒
(
There exist x1 ∈ F (X1, µ(1)), x2 ∈ F (X2, µ(2)), y1 ∈ X1, and y2 ∈ X2
such that d = g(y, µ)− g(x, µ), where x = (x1,x2) and y = (y1,y2)
)
⇐
(†)⇒
(
∃ d1 ∈ D(F,X1, µ(1)) and d2 ∈ D(F,X2, µ(2)) such that d = s1d1 + s2d2
)
.
Here (∗) is because X = X1 ×X2 and F (X , µ) = F (X1, µ(1))× F (X2, µ(2)) (because F
is decomposable), while (†) is by equation (C9). 3 Claim 1
For any N ∈ N, let ∆N :=
{
s ∈ RN+ ;
∑N
n=1 sn = 1
}
be the N -simplex.
Claim 2: Let N ≥ 2, and let d1, . . . ,dN ∈ Dω(F,X). There exists a dense subset
S ⊆ ∆N such that, for any s = (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ S, we have
N∑
n=1
snd
n ∈ Dω(F,X).
Proof: For all n ∈ [1...N ], there exists (Xn, µn) ∈ ∆ω(X) such that dn ∈ D(F,Xn, µn).
Let Kn = |Kn| for n ∈ [1...N ]. Define
S :=
{
(m1K1, m2K2, . . . ,mNKN)
m1K1 + · · ·+mNKN ; m1, . . . ,mN ∈ N
}
. (C10)
Then S is a dense subset of ∆N .
Let s ∈ S and let m1, . . . ,mN be as in eqn.(C10). Define
X := X1 × · · · × X1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
×X2 × · · · × X2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
× · · · · · · × XN × · · · × XN︸ ︷︷ ︸
mN
Then X ∈ X (by definition of X). For all n ∈ [2 . . . N ], define Mn := m1 + · · ·+mn−1.
Inductive application of Claim 2(a) yields some µ ∈ ∆ω(X ) such that µ(j) = µ1 for
all j ∈ [1 . . .m1], and µ(j) = µ2 for all j ∈ [m1+1 . . .m1+m2], and more generally,
µ(j) = µn for all n ∈ [2 . . . N ] and all j ∈ [Mn+1 . . .Mn+mn]. Next, inductive
application of Claim 2(c) implies that s1d
1 + · · ·+sNdN ∈ D(F,X , µ). Thus, equation
(C8) implies that s1d
1 + · · ·+ sNdN ∈ Dω(F,X). 3 Claim 2
Now, Pω(X, F ) is the closure of Dω(X, F ). Thus, for any d1, . . . ,dN ∈ Dω(X, F ) and
any (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ ∆N , Claim 2 implies that s1d1 + · · · + sNdN ∈ Pω(X, F ). Thus
Pω(X, F ) contains the convex hull conv[Dω(X, F )]. Thus, Dω(X, F ) ⊆ conv[Dω(X, F )] ⊆
Pω(X, F ) = Dω(X, F ); hence Pω(X, F ) = conv[Dω(X, F )], so Pω(X, F ) is the closure of
a convex set, and thus, itself convex.
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(b) Let X1, . . . ,XN be judgement spaces, and suppose X := 〈X1, . . . ,XN〉. Define
E :=
N⋃
n=1
⋃
µ∈∆ω(Xn)
D(F,Xn, µ).
Then E is a finite set, because for each n ∈ [1 . . . N ], the set ∆ω(Xn) is finite (because ω
is finitary), and for each µ ∈ ∆ω(Xn), the set D(F,Xn, µ) is finite (because Xn is finite).
Thus, conv(E) is the convex hull of a finite set, and thus, a closed, convex polytope in
RQ.
For any X ∈ X, if X = Xm11 × Xm22 × · · · × XmNN , then Claim 1(c) implies that
every element of Dω(F,X ) is a rational convex combination of elements from E . Thus,
Dω(F,X ) ⊆ conv(E). This holds for all X ∈ X; thus, Dω(F,X) ⊆ conv(E). Since conv(E)
is closed, we deduce that cl (Dω(F,X)) ⊆ conv(E).
Conversely, Claim 2 shows that every convex combination of elements from E lies in
cl (Dω(F,X)). Thus, conv(E) ⊆ cl (Dω(F,X)).
Thus, conv(E) = cl (Dω(F,X)) = Pω(F,X). Thus, Pω(F,X) is a convex polytope. 2
Let Γ be the vector space of all real-valued functions on (0, 1] of the form
∑N
n=1 an 1(qn,rn],
where N ∈ N, and an ∈ R and 0 ≤ qn < rn ≤ 1 for all n ∈ [1...N ]. Let Γ+ be the set
of all elements of Γ which are nonnegative everywhere. A positive linear functional on Γ is
a linear function P : Γ−→∗R such that P (γ) ≥ 0 for all γ ∈ Γ+. Let Γ∗+ be the set of
all positive linear functionals on Γ. The next result is used in the proof of Lemma C.8
(below), which is necessary to prove Proposition C.1 and Theorem 4.2(a). It is also used
to prove Theorems 6.3 and 6.4(a), as well as Propositions 5.2(a) and 6.2.
Lemma C.7 Let Φ
OND
be the set of odd, nondecreasing functions from [−1, 1] into ∗R.
(a) There is a bijective correspondence between Φ
OND
and Γ∗+ defined as follows. Given
any φ ∈ Φ
OND
, define φ∗ : Γ−→∗R by first defining φ∗ (1(q,r]) := φ(r) − φ(q) for all
q < r ∈ [0, 1], and then extending φ∗ to all of Γ by linearity. Then φ∗ ∈ Γ∗+.
To invert this map, suppose P ∈ Γ∗+. Define φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R by first setting φ(q) :=
P (1(0,q]) for all q ∈ [0, 1], and then defining φ(q) := −φ(−q) for all q ∈ [−1, 0]. Then
φ ∈ Φ
OND
, and φ∗ = P .
Let X be a judgement space, and let µ ∈ ∆(X ).
(b) For all x ∈ X and any φ ∈ Φ
OND
, we have γµ,x ∈ Γ+, and φ∗(γx,µ) =
∑
k∈M(x,µ)
φ |µ˜k|.
(c) Thus, for any φ ∈ Φ
OND
, we have Fφ(X , µ) = argmax
x∈X
φ∗(γµ,x).
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Proof: (a) Given φ ∈ Φ
OND
, it is easy to check that φ∗ ∈ Γ∗+.
Conversely, let P ∈ Γ∗+ and define φ as above. By construction, φ is odd and φ(0) = 0.
To see that φ is nondecreasing, let q < r ∈ (0, 1]. Then
φ(r) = P (1(0,r]) = P
(
1(0,q] + 1(q,r]
)
= P (1(0,q]) + P (1(q,r]) ≥
(∗)
P (1(0,q]) = φ(q).
(C11)
(∗) because P (1(q,r]) ≥ 0 because P is positive, and 1(q,r] ∈ Γ+. Equation (C11) also
shows that P
(
1(q,r]
)
= φ(r)− φ(q) for q < r ∈ (0, 1]; thus P = φ∗.
(b) For any x ∈ X , defining equation (5) can be rewritten: γx,µ =
∑
k∈M(x,µ)
1(0,|µ˜k|]. Thus,
φ∗(γx,µ) =
∑
k∈M(x,µ)
φ∗(1(0,|µ˜k|]) =
∑
k∈M(x,µ)
φ |µ˜k|.
(c) follows from part (b) and Lemma 3.3. 2
The next lemma is actually one component of Proposition 5.2(a) and Theorem 4.2(a). We
prove it here because it is necessary for the proof of Proposition C.1.
Lemma C.8 For any judgement problem (X , µ) and any gain function φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R,
we have Fφ(X , µ) ⊆ SSME (X , µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ).
Proof: (by contrapositive) Let y ∈ X , and suppose y 6∈ SSME (X , µ); we will show that
y 6∈ Fφ(X , µ).
Define φ∗ : Γ−→∗R as in Lemma C.7(a). For any ρ ∈ ∆Q(X ), we have γµ,ρ ∈ Γ+, and
φ∗ (γµ,ρ) () φ
∗
(∑
x∈X
ρ(x) · γµ,x
)
=
∑
x∈X
ρ(x) · φ∗ (γµ,x) . (C12)
where () is by eqn.(D1) defining γµ,ρ.
If y 6∈ SSME (X , µ), then there exists ρ ∈ ∆Q(X ) such that ρ µ y. Thus, γµ,ρ ≥ γµ,y,
and there exist q1 < q2 ∈ [0, 1] such that γµ,ρ(r) > γµ,y(r) for all r ∈ [q1, q2]. For any
 > 0, let R := {r ∈ [q1, q2] ; γµ,ρ(r)− γµ,y(r) > }. If  is small enough, then there
exist r1 < r2 ∈ [q1, q2] such that (r1, r2] ∈ R; thus, γµ,ρ − γµ,y ≥  · 1(r1,r2]. Thus,
φ∗ (γµ,ρ)− φ∗ (γµ,y) = φ∗ (γµ,ρ − γµ,y) ≥
(∗)
φ∗
(
1(r1,r2]
)
=  · φ∗ (1(r1,r2]) =  (φ(r2)− φ(r1)) >
(†)
0. (C13)
Here, (∗) is because φ∗ is positive and γµ,ρ − γµ,y ≥  · 1(r1,r2], while (†) is because φ is
strictly increasing. Combine (C12) and (C13) to get∑
x∈X
ρ(x) · φ∗ (γµ,x) > φ∗ (γµ,y) .
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Thus, there is some x ∈ X such that φ∗ (γµ,x) > φ∗ (γµ,y). Thus, y 6∈ Fφ(X , µ), by
Lemma C.7(c).
It is clear from their definitions that SSME (X , µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ) (or see the proof of
Proposition 5.1 below.) 2
Proof of Proposition C.1. “⇐=” If φ is strictly increasing, then for all X ∈ X and
µ ∈ ∆ω(X ), Lemma C.8 says Fφ(µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ), and thus, F (µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ). Thus,
F is supermajority efficient on ∆ω(X).
“=⇒” Lemma C.6(b) says Pω(F,X) is a closed, convex polytope in RQ. If F is
SME, then Lemma C.5 implies that Pω(F,X) ∩ RQ+ = {0}. Thus, Lemma C.4 yields an
all-positive vector v ∈ RQ+ such that v • p ≤ 0 for all p ∈ Pω(F,X).
Now we define φ : Qω−→R as follows: for all r ∈ Qω, define
φ(r) :=
∑
q∈Q
q≤r
vq if r ≥ 0, and φ(r) := −φ(−r) if r ≤ 0. (C14)
Then φ is odd. Also, φ is increasing on Qω, because vq > 0 for all q ∈ Qω.
Let X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆ω(X ). For any x ∈ X , recall M(µ,x) := {k ∈ K; xkµ˜k ≥ 0}.
Claim 1: For any x ∈ X , we have |K| · v • g(x, µ) =
∑
k∈M(x,µ)
φ |µ˜k|.
Proof: For any r, q ∈ [−1, 1], define δrq := 1 if r ≥ q, whereas δrq := 0 if r < q. Then
|K| · v • g(x, µ) = |K| ·
∑
q∈Q
vq · gq(x, µ) ()
∑
q∈Q
vq ·#{k ∈ K ; xk µ˜k ≥ q}
=
∑
q∈Q
vq
∑
k∈K
δxk µ˜kq =
∑
k∈K
∑
q∈Q
vq δ
xk µ˜k
q
=
∑
k∈K
∑
q∈Q
q≤xk µ˜k
vq (∗)
∑
k∈K
xk µ˜k≥0
φ(xk µ˜k) =
∑
k∈M(x,µ)
φ|µ˜k|.
Here, () is by definition (C7), while (∗) is by definition (C14). 3 Claim 1
We must show that F (X , µ) ⊆ Fφ(X , µ). To see this, let x ∈ F (X , µ). For any other
y ∈ X , we have g(y, µ)− g(x, µ) ∈ Dω(F,X) ⊆ Pω(F,X), so v • (g(y, µ)− g(x, µ)) ≤ 0,
and hence v •g(y, µ) ≤ v •g(x, µ). Thus, F (X , µ) ⊆ argmax
x∈X
(v •g(µ,x)). Thus, Claim
1 and Corollary 3.3(a) imply that F (X , µ) ⊆ Fφ(X , µ), as desired.
Unique minimal cover. Let G be the set of additive majority rules which cover F on
∆ω(X), and which are defined by real-valued gain functions. We have just shown that
G 6= ∅.
Claim 2: G is finite.
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Proof: Recall that X is finitely generated —say it is generated by the judgement spaces
X1, . . . ,XN . For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], the spaces Xn is finite (it is a subset of a finite-
dimensional Hamming cube). Thus, since ω has finite support, the set ∆ω(Xn) is
finite. Thus, if Fn is the set of all possible judgement aggregation rules from ∆ω(Xn)
into Xn, then Fn is also finite.
Any judgement aggregation rule F on ∆ω(X) which satisfies Decomposition is ob-
tained by choosing one rule Fn ∈ Fn for each n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Thus, the set of all
aggregation rules on ∆ω(X) satisfying Decomposition is also finite. In particular, this
means the set G is finite. 3 Claim 2
Claim 2 implies that we can write G = {Fφ1 , Fφ2 , . . . , FφL}, for some gain functions
φ1, φ2, . . . , φL : [−1, 1]−→R. Now define φ :=
L∑
`=1
φ`.
Claim 3: Fφ covers F on ∆ω(X).
Proof: Let X ∈ X and let µ ∈ ∆ω(X ). Then for all ` ∈ [1 . . . L], we have F (X , µ) ⊆
Fφ`(X , µ), by definition of the set G. This means: for all x ∈ F (X , µ) and all other
y ∈ X , we have φ`(µ˜) • x ≥ φ`(µ˜) • y. By summing these inequalities over all
` ∈ [1 . . . L], it follows that φ(µ˜) •x ≥ φ(µ˜) •y. This holds for all x ∈ F (X , µ) and all
other y ∈ X ; it follows that F (X , µ) ⊆ Fφ(X , µ), as desired. 3 Claim 3
Claim 4: For all ` ∈ [1 . . . L], the rule Fφ` covers Fφ on ∆ω(X).
Proof: (by contrapositive) Let X ∈ X, let µ ∈ ∆ω(X ), and suppose x 6∈ Fφ`(X , µ) for
some ` ∈ [1 . . . L]. We will show that x 6∈ Fφ(X , µ).
Let y ∈ F (X , µ). Then for all `′ ∈ [1 . . . L], we have y ∈ Fφ`′ (X , µ), and thus,
φ`′(µ˜) • y ≥ φ`′(µ˜) • x. In particular, y ∈ Fφ`(X , µ), whereas x 6∈ Fφ`(X , µ); thus,
φ`(µ˜) • y > φ`(µ˜) • x. By summing these inequalities over all `′ ∈ [1 . . . L], it follows
that φ(µ˜) • y > φ(µ˜) • x. Thus, x 6∈ Fφ(X , µ). 3 Claim 4
Claims 3 and 4 imply that Fφ is a minimal covering of F by an additive majority rule.
Minimality implies uniqueness.
Finally, if G is any additive majority rule on ∆ω(X), then Lemma C.3 says that G can
be represented with a real-valued gain function. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let X := 〈X 〉. Fix N ∈ N, and define ω(n) := 1 for
all n ∈ [1 . . . N ] while ω(0) := 1 for all n > N ; then ∆ω(X) = ∆N〈X 〉. Now apply
Proposition C.1. 2
The proofs of Theorem 4.2(c) and Proposition 6.2 use the following result.
41
Lemma C.9 Let F,G : ∆(X )⇒ X be two judgement aggregation rules. Suppose F (µ) ⊆
G(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(X ), and G is monotone, and F is upper hemicontinuous. Then
F (µ) = G(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(X ).
Proof: Let µ ∈ ∆(X ). We have F (µ) ⊆ G(µ) by hypothesis; we must show F (µ) ⊇ G(µ).
So, let x ∈ G(µ); we will show that x ∈ F (µ). Let δx ∈ ∆(X ) be the unanimous profile
at x. For all n ∈ N, define µn := (1 − 1n)µ + 1nδx. Then µn is more supportive of x
than µ, so G(µn) = {x} because G is monotone. Thus, F (µn) = {x} because F ⊆ G,
and F (µn) must be nonempty. However, lim
n→∞
µn = µ, and F is upper hemicontinuous.
Thus, x ∈ F (µ), as desired. 2
Theorem 4.2 is obtained by using an ultrapower construction to “stitch together” the gain
functions defined in Proposition C.1 for every possible choice of weight function ω and
finitely generated judgement monoid X.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. (a) Lemma C.2 says that any additive majority rule is decom-
posable, while Lemma C.8 says it is SME.
(b) “⇐=” exactly the same proof as Proposition C.1.
“=⇒” Let FGSM(X) be the set of all finitely generated sub-monoids of X. Let
I := Ω× FGSM(X). In effect, I is the set of possible “inputs” to Proposition C.1.
For any finite collection T := {(X1, µ1), (X2, µ2), . . . , (XN , µN)} ⊂ ∆(X), define
IT := {(ω,Y) ∈ I; Xn ∈ Y and µn ∈ ∆ω(Xn) for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]}. Then let
E := {J ⊆ I; IT ⊆ J for some nonempty finite T ⊂ ∆(X)}.
Claim 1: E is a free filter.
Proof: We must check axioms (F0)-(F2) from Appendix A.
(F0) Let T := {(X1, µ1), (X2, µ2), . . . , (XN , µN)} ⊂ ∆(X). Fix ω ∈ Ω, and suppose
supp(ω) = [1 . . .W ]. Let M := W ·|X1|·|X2| · · · |XN |, and let β : [1 . . .M ]−→[1 . . .W ]×
X1 ×X2 × · · · × XN be some bijection. Define ω′ ∈ Ω as follows: for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ],
if β(m) = (w,x1, . . . ,xN), then let ω
′(m) := ω(w) · µ1(x1) · · ·µN(xN). Let Y ⊂ X
be any finitely generated sub-monoid of X containing the finitely generated monoid
〈X1, . . . ,XN〉. Then it is easy to check that (Xn, µn) ∈ ∆ω′(Y) for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
Thus, (ω′,Y) ∈ IT .
We can repeat this construction for any ω ∈ Ω; thus, IT is infinite. This holds for
any finite T ⊂ ∆(X). Every element of E must contain IT for some finite T ⊂ ∆(X);
thus, every element of E is infinite.
(F1) Let E ,F ∈ E. Then there exist finite sets S, T ⊂ ∆(X) such that IS ⊆ E and
IT ⊆ F . But then S ∪T is also finite, and IS∪T = IS ∩IT ⊆ E ∩F ; thus, E ∩F ∈ E.
(F2) Suppose E ∈ E and E ⊆ D. Then there is some finite T ⊂ ∆(X) such that IT ⊆ E .
But then IT ⊆ D; thus D ∈ E also. 3 Claim 1
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Now Claim 1 and the Ultrafilter Lemma yields a free ultrafilter F with E ⊆ F. Let ∗R
be the hyperreal field defined by F (see Appendix A). We define φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R as
follows. For all (ω,Y) ∈ I, Proposition C.1 yields an odd, strictly increasing function
φω,Y : Qω−→R. Recall that Qω is a finite subset of [−1, 1] (because ω has finite support).
Thus, we can extend φω,Y to an odd, continuous increasing function φω,Y : [−1, 1]−→R,
by linearly interpolating the values between the points in Qω. Now, for any r ∈ [−1, 1],
define φ̂(r) ∈ RI by:
φ̂(r)ω,Y := φω,Y(r), for all (ω,Y) ∈ I. (C15)
Then define φ(r) ∈ ∗R to be the ( ∼
F
)-equivalence class of φˆ(r).
Claim 2: φ is odd and strictly increasing.
Proof: Odd. Let r ∈ [−1, 1]. For all (ω,Y) ∈ I, we have φω,Y(−r) = −φω,Y(r), because
φω,Y is odd by construction. But I ∈ F, by definition of F. Thus, φ(−r) = −φ(r).
Increasing. Let q, r ∈ [−1, 1], with q < r. For all (ω,Y) ∈ I, we have φω,Y(q) <
φω,Y(r), because φω,Y is increasing by construction. But I ∈ F by definition of F.
Thus, we obtain φ(q) < φ(r), by defining formula (A1). 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: For any X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆(X ), we have F (X , µ) ⊆ Fφ(X , µ).
Proof: Let x ∈ F (X , µ); we must show that x ∈ Fφ(X , µ). For all (ω,Y) ∈ I{(X ,µ)},
Proposition C.1 says that F (X , µ) ⊆ Fφω,Y(X , µ); thus, for all y ∈ X , we have (x −
y) • φω,Y(µ) ≥ 0. Thus, if we define Iy := {(ω,Y) ∈ I; (x − y) • φω,Y(µ) ≥ 0},
then Iy ⊇ I{(X ,µ)}. But I{(X ,µ)} ∈ F; thus, Iy ∈ F, by axiom (F2) from Appendix A.
Thus, (x − y) • φ(µ) ≥ 0, by defining formula (A1). This holds for all y ∈ X ; thus,
x ∈ Fφ(X , µ).
This holds for all x ∈ F (X , µ); thus, F (X , µ) ⊆ Fφ(X , µ). 3 Claim 3
Since F (X , µ) must be nonempty, we must have F (X , µ) = Fφ(X , µ) whenever Fφ(X , µ)
is single-valued. But φ is strictly increasing, so Fφ is single-valued on a dense, open
subset of ∆(X ), by Proposition 3.4(b).
(c) For all (ω,Y) ∈ I, Proposition C.1 says that we can choose the gain functions φω,Y such
that the additive majority rule Fφω,Y is the minimal covering of F on ∆ω(Y). Suppose
we perform the construction in part (b) using this set of gain functions; we claim the
resulting rule Fφ is a minimal covering of F on ∆(X).
To see this, let ψ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be another gain function, such that the additive
majority rule Fψ covers F on ∆(X). Let X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆(X ); we must show that
Fφ(X , µ) ⊆ Fψ(X , µ). So, let x ∈ Fφ(X , µ); we will show that x ∈ Fψ(X , µ).
For all y ∈ X , let Ix,y := {(ω,Y) ∈ I; x • φω,Y(µ˜) ≥ y • φω,Y(µ˜)}. Then Ix,y ∈ F, by
formula (A1) (because x • φ(µ) ≥ y • φ(µ), because x ∈ Fφ(X , µ)). Thus, if we define
Ix :=
{
(ω,Y) ∈ I{(X ,µ)} ; x ∈ Fφω,Y(X , µ)
}
= I{(X ,µ)} ∩
⋂
y∈X
Ix,y,
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then Ix ∈ F, by axiom (F1) (because it is a finite intersection of F-elements, because X
is a finite set). Thus, Ix is nonempty, by axiom (F0).
Now, for all (ω,Y) ∈ I{(X ,µ)}, the rule Fψ covers F on ∆ω(Y). Thus, Fψ also covers
Fφω,Y (because Fφω,Y is the minimal covering of F on ∆ω(Y)). Thus, if we take any
(ω,Y) ∈ Ix, we obtain x ∈ Fφω,Y(X , µ) ⊆ Fψ(X , µ). Thus, x ∈ Fψ(X , µ).
This argument works for all x ∈ Fφ(X , µ); we conclude that Fφ(X , µ) ⊆ Fψ(X , µ), as
desired.
(d) “=⇒” This follows from part (a).
“⇐=” Let φ be the gain function constructed in part (b). Then Fφ covers F . The
rule Fφ is monotone, by Proposition 3.4(a). Meanwhile F is uhc by hypothesis. Thus,
Lemma C.9 implies that F (µ) = Fφ(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(X ). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The proof strategy is almost identical to the proof of
Theorem 4.2(b). Let X be the set of all judgement aggregation problems. (Thus, X is
closed under Cartesian products.) Define I as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, and for
each (ω,Y) ∈ I, let φω,Y : Qω−→R be the gain function from Lemma C.3. Then define
φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R as in Eq.(C15). The proof of Claim 2 is exactly as before. But we
replace Claim 3 with the following:
Claim 1: For any X ∈ X and µ ∈ ∆(X ), we have Fφ(X , µ) = Fψ(X , µ).
Proof: Suppose x ∈ Fψ(X , µ) and z 6∈ Fψ(X , µ). We must show that x ∈ Fφ(X , µ) and
z 6∈ Fφ(X , µ). For all (ω,Y) ∈ I{(X ,µ)}, Lemma C.3 says that Fψ(X , µ) = Fφω,Y(X , µ);
thus, for all y ∈ X , we have (x−y)•φω,Y(µ) ≥ 0, and furthermore, (x−z)•φω,Y(µ) > 0.
Thus, if we define Iy,≥ := {(ω,Y) ∈ I; (x − y) • φω,Y(µ) ≥ 0}, then Iy,≥ ⊇ I{(X ,µ)}.
Also, if we define Iz,> := {(ω,Y) ∈ I; (x − z) • φω,Y(µ) > 0}, then Iz,> ⊇ I{(X ,µ)}.
But I{(X ,µ)} ∈ F; thus, we get Iy,≥ ∈ F and Iz,> ∈ F , by axiom (F2) from Appendix
A. Thus, (x− y) • φ(µ) ≥ 0, by the defining formula (A1). This holds for all y ∈ X ;
thus, x ∈ Fφ(X , µ). Likewise, (x − z) • φ(µ) > 0 by the defining formula (A1), so
z 6∈ Fφ(X , µ). 3 Claim 1
2
D Proofs from Section 5
It will be convenient to introduce another definition of SSME. For any probability measure
ρ ∈ ∆(X ), and any q ∈ (0, 1], define
γµ,ρ(q) :=
∑
x∈X
ρ(x) · γµ,x(q). (D1)
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For example, fix N ∈ N and suppose ρ(x) = Nx/N for all x ∈ X , where {Nx}x∈X is a
collection of natural numbers such that
∑
x∈X Nx = N . Let ν ∈ ∆(XN) by a profile such
that ν(n) = µ for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], and let y = (y1,y2, . . . ,yN) ∈ XN be such that, for all
x ∈ X , we have #{n ∈ [1 . . . N ]; yn = x} = Nx. Then γµ,ρ = γν,y/N
For any ρ1, ρ2 ∈ ∆(X ), write “ρ1 µ ρ2” if γµ,ρ1(q) ≥ γµ,ρ2(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1], with at
least one strict inequality. Then 
µ
is a partial order on ∆(X ). For any x ∈ X , define the
unanimous profile δx ∈ ∆(X ) by setting δx(x) := 1, while δx(y) := 0, for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
Clearly γµ,δx = γµ,x. We say x ∈ X is strongly supermajority efficient (SSME) if δx is
undominated in (∆(X ), 
µ
). It is easy to check that this is equivalent to the definition
given in Section 5.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. SSME (X , µ) is always nonempty because it is obtained by
maximizing over a finite set. For any x,y ∈ X , observe that(
M(x, µ) ⊃M(y, µ)
)
=⇒
(
x 
µ
y
)
=⇒
(
δx µ δy
)
.
Thus, if δy is undominated in (∆(X ), µ ), then y must be undominated in (X , µ ).
Likewise if y is undominated in (X , 
µ
), then y must be Condorcet admissible in X .
Thus, SSME (X , µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ) ⊆ Cond (X , µ). 2
Proof of Proposition 5.2. (a) “[iii] =⇒ [ii]” is immediate, while “[ii] =⇒ [i]” follows
immediately from Lemma C.8. It remains to prove “[i] =⇒ [iii]”.
LetQ(µ) := {|µ˜k| ; k ∈ K}, and writeQ = {q1, q2, . . . , qN}, where 0 ≤ q1 < q2 < · · · <
qN ≤ 1. Define q0 := 0. Let Γ be the space of functions defined above Lemma C.7. Define
a linear injective map fµ : RN−→Γ by setting fµ(r1, . . . , rN) := r11(0,q1] +r21(q1,q2] + · · ·+
rN1(qN−1,qN ] for all (r1, . . . , rN) ∈ RN . Let Γµ := fµ[RN ] (a linear subspace of Γ); then
γµ,ρ ∈ Γµ for all ρ ∈ ∆(X ). Let gµ := f−1µ : Γµ−→RN , and then define Gµ : ∆(X )−→RN
by Gµ(ρ) := gµ(γµ,ρ). Let Pµ := Gµ[∆(X )]; then Pµ is a convex, compact polytope in
RN . For all x ∈ X , let Gµ(x) := gµ(γµ,x) ∈ Pµ. Let “<” be the Pareto relation on RN .
Fix x ∈ X . We have (
x 
µ
ρ
)
⇐⇒
(
Gµ(x) < Gµ(ρ)
)
, for all ρ ∈ ∆(X ).
Thus,
(
x ∈ SSME (X , µ)
)
⇐⇒
(
Gµ(x) is Pareto optimal in Pµ
)
.
Lemma C.4 now yields a strictly positive vector v ∈ RN+ such that
v •Gµ(x) ≥ v • p, for all p ∈ Pµ. (D2)
Construct φ ∈ ΦI such that φ(qn)−φ(qn−1) = vn for all n ∈ [1...N ]. (For example, φ could
be piecewise linear, with vertices at q1, . . . , qN .) Let φ
∗ : Γ−→R be the positive linear
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functional defined by φ, as in Lemma C.7(a). Then for all y ∈ X , if Gµ(y) = p ∈ Pµ,
then γµ,y = fµ(p), so that
φ∗(γµ,y) = φ∗ (fµ(p)) = φ∗
(
N∑
n=1
pn1(qn−1,qn]
)
=
N∑
n=1
pnφ
∗ (1(qn−1,qn]) (D3)
=
N∑
n=1
pn
(
φ(qn)− φ(qn−1)
)
=
N∑
n=1
pnvn = v • p = v •Gµ(y).
Thus,
(
v •Gµ(x) ≥ v •Gµ(y)
)
⇐⇒
(
φ∗(γµ,x) ≥ φ∗(γµ,y)
)
.
Thus, equation (D2) implies that φ∗(γµ,x) ≥ φ∗(γµ,y) for all y ∈ X . Thus, Lemma C.7(c)
says that x ∈ Fφ(X , µ), as desired.
(b) Let x,y ∈ SSME (X , µ). If γx,µ 6= γy,µ, then Gµ(x) 6= Gµ(y). Thus, in the proof of
(a), we can choose some v ∈ RN+ satisfying equation (D2), and such that v • Gµ(x) >
v •Gµ(y). Thus, if φ ∈ ΦI is the function defined by v, then equation (D3) implies that
φ∗(γµ,x) > φ∗(γµ,y). Thus, Lemma C.7(c) says that y 6∈ Fφ(X , µ). 2
Judgement | Partition µ(•) a∼
c,d,e,f
b∼
c,d,e,f
a ∼ g b ∼ g a ∼ h b ∼ h c,d,e,f6∼g,h a ∼ b c∼d∼e∼f g ∼ h
t {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h} 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1
u {a, b, g, h}, {c, d, e, f} 0.45 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
v {a, b, c, d, e, f}, {g, h} 0.35 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1
w {a, c, d, e, f}, {b, g, h} 0 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1
w′ {b, c, d, e, f}, {a, g, h} 0 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1
y {a, b}, {c, d, e, f}, {g, h} 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1
z1 {a}, {c, d, e, f}, {b, g, h} 0 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1
z2 {b}, {c, d, e, f}, {a, g, h} 0 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1
z3 {a, b, g}, {c, d, e, f}, {h} 0 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1
z4 {a, b, h}, {c, d, e, f}, {g} 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1
µ˜k 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 1 1 1
Majk(µ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
# coords 4 4 1 1 1 1 8 1 6 1
Table 1: The proof of Proposition 5.3: an example where SSME (X eqA , µ) 6= SME (X eqA , µ). For brevity,
we have grouped several coordinates of K in some columns. For example, the column labelled “a ∼ g, h”
corresponds to the two assertions a ∼ g and a ∼ h, while “ a∼c,d,e,f ” corresponds to the four assertions: a ∼ c,
a ∼ d, a ∼ e, and a ∼ f . The last row (“# coords”) indicates the number of coordinates represented by
each column.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Let A := {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}, and let K be the set of all
cardinality-2 subsets of A (so |K| = 28). For any equivalence relation “∼” on A, we
define the element x∼ ∈ {±1}K by setting x∼{i,j} := 1 if i ∼ j, while x∼{i,j} := −1 if i 6∼ j,
for all i, j ∈ A. Let X eqA := {x∼; “∼” is any equivalence relation on A}.
Let t ∈ X eqA correspond to the “total” equivalence relation where all elements are
equivalent (i.e. with a single equivalence class {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}). Let u ∈ X eqA corre-
spond to the equivalence class partition {a, b, g, h}, {c, d, e, f}. Let v ∈ X eqA correspond
to the equivalence class partition {a, b, c, d, e, f}, {g, h}. Let µ ∈ ∆(X eqA ) be the profile
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q ∈ (0, 0.1] q ∈ (0.1, 0.3] q ∈ (0.3, 0.6] q ∈ (0.6, 1]
γµ,t(q) 20 12 8 8
γµ,u(q) 20 20 16 8
γµ,v(q) 24 16 16 8
γµ,w(q) = γµ,w′(q) 21 17 15 7
γµ,y(q) 16 16 16 8
γµ,z1(q) = · · · = γµ,z4(q) 17 17 15 7
γµ,ρ(q) 22 18 16 8
Table 2: The proof of Proposition 5.3: an example where SSME (X eqA , µ) 6= SME (X eqA , µ).
such that µ(t) = 0.2, µ(u) = 0.45, µ(v) = 0.35, and µ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X eqA \{t,u,v}.
The structure of µ and µ˜ is described in Table 1. For future reference, Table 1 also
describes a few other elements of X eqA , namely w, w′, y, and z1, . . . , z4. We will be
particularly interested in w (which corresponds to the partition {a, c, d, e, f}, {b, g, h})
and w′ (which corresponds to the partition {b, c, d, e, f}, {a, g, h}). The functions γt,µ,
γu,µ, γv,µ, γw,µ = γw′,µ γy,µ, and γz1,µ = · · · = γz4,µ are described in Table 2.
Claim 1: w,w′ ∈ SME (X eqA , µ).
Proof: (by contradiction) Suppose not. Then there is some x ∈ X eqA such that γµ,x ≥
γµ,w = γµ,w′ , with at least one strict inequality. This means that
γx,µ(q) ≥

7 if 1 ≥ q > 0.6;
15 if 0.6 ≥ q > 0.3;
17 if 0.3 ≥ q > 0.1;
21 if 0.1 ≥ q > 0;
and at least one of these
inequalities is strict.
(D4)
We will show that this is impossible. There are three cases.
Case 1. If γµ,x(1) = 8, then x must support all the assertions “a ∼ b”, “c ∼ d ∼ e ∼
f”, and “g ∼ h”. Thus, x must be one of t, u, v or y. But if γµ,x(0.6) ≥ 15, then
x 6= t. Likewise, if γµ,x(0.3) ≥ 17, then x 6= v or y. And if γµ,x(0.1) ≥ 21, then x 6= u.
Contradiction.
Case 2. If γµ,x(0.6) = 16, then x must support all the assertions “a ∼ b”, “c ∼ d ∼
e ∼ f”, and “g ∼ h”, and also assert “c, d, e, f 6∼ g, h”. Thus, x must be one of u, v
or y. Now the analysis proceeds as in Case 1.
Case 3. Suppose γµ,x(q) = 7 for all q ∈ (0.6, 1], and γµ,x(q) = 15 for all q ∈ (0.3, 0.6].
Then x must support all 8 of the coordinates encoding the assertions “c, d, e, f 6∼ g, h”,
and must support exactly 7 out of the 8 coordinates encoding the assertions “a ∼ b”,
“c ∼ d ∼ e ∼ f”, and “g ∼ h”. Transitivity makes it impossible to assert only 5 out
the 6 coordinates asserting “c ∼ d ∼ e ∼ f”. Thus:
Either x asserts “a ∼ b”, or x asserts “g ∼ h”, but not both. (D5)
Now, also suppose that γµ,x(0.3) ≥ 17. Then x must support at least two out of
the four coordinates encoding the assertions “a, b ∼ g, h”. Transitivity and statement
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(D5) imply that x encodes exactly two of these assertions. Thus, x must be one of
z1, . . . , z4, w, or w
′. But from Table 2, it is clear that γµ,zi(q) = 17 for all q ∈ [0, 0.3)
and all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Thus, z1, . . . , z4 violate the last inequality in (D4). Thus, x
must be one of w or w′. But then no inequality in (D4) is strict. Contradiction.
3 Claim 1
Now, let ρ := 1
2
δu +
1
2
δv; then ρ ∈ ∆(X ), and γρ,µ = (γu,µ + γv,µ)/2. From the last line
of Table 2, we see that γρ,µ(q) > γw,µ(q) = γw′,µ(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, ρ µ δw, δw′ ;
thus, w,w′ 6∈ SSME (X eqA , µ). Thus, SSME (X eqA , µ) 6= SME (X eqA , µ), so X eqA is not neat.
2
Remark. In the proof of Proposition 5.3, note that w and w′ violate unanimity in the
coordinate “a ∼ b”. This shows that supermajority efficiency does not always respect
unanimity on X eqA . (In contrast, it can be shown that supermajority efficiency does always
respect unanimity on X prA .)
E Proofs from Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Let µ and ν be generic profiles in ∆(X ) such that µ is
majority determinate and ν is supermajority indeterminate. Let β := sup{r ∈ [0, 1];
rν+ (1− r)µ is majority determinate} = sup{r ∈ [0, 1]; Maj (rν + (1− r)µ)∩X 6= ∅}.
Clearly β < 1, and, for some k ∈ K, we have
βν˜k + (1− β) µ˜k = 0.
Generically, this k is unique. In this case, it is easily verified that for sufficiently small
 > 0 and α = β + , the profile αν + (1− α)µ is barely Condorcet inconsistent. 2
Proof of Proposition 6.2. “(a) ⇐⇒ (c)” Let µ ∈ ∆(X ), and let x ∈ SME (X , µ).
Then for all y ∈ X , we have y ∈ SME (X , µ) iff y ≡
µ
x, because X is supermajority
determinate. Thus, F satisfies SME and SMEQ if and only if F (µ) = SME (X , µ) for
all µ ∈ ∆(X ).
“(d) =⇒ (a)” Fφ is SME by Lemma C.8, and Fφ is SMEQ by Lemma C.7(c) and
supermajority determinacy.
“(a) =⇒ (d)” Fφ is SME by Lemma C.8, while F is SME by hypothesis. Thus, for
any µ ∈ ∆(X ), any x ∈ Fφ(X , µ), and any y ∈ F (µ), we have y ≡µ x, because X is
supermajority determinate. Thus, Fφ(X , µ) ⊆ Fφ(µ) because F is SMEQ by hypothesis;
conversely, F (µ) ⊆ Fφ(X , µ) because Fφ is SMEQ by Lemma C.7(c).
“(b) =⇒ (d)” Let µ ∈ ∆(X ). Lemma C.8 says Fφ(X , µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ). But X is
supermajoritary determinate, so γµ,x = γµ,y for all x,y ∈ SME (X , µ). Thus, Lemma
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C.7(c) implies that Fφ(X , µ) = SME (X , µ). Thus, if F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X is any other
supermajority efficient rule, then F (µ) ⊆ Fφ(X , µ).
This argument holds for all µ ∈ ∆(X ). However, Fφ is monotone, by Proposition
3.4(a). Thus, if F is also upper hemicontinuous, then Lemma C.9 says that F = Fφ.
“(d) =⇒(b)” If F = Fφ for any gain function φ, then in particular this holds for
any continuous, real-valued gain functin φ. Then Lemma C.8 says F is SME, while
Proposition 3.5 say F is uhc. 2
The proof of Theorem 6.3 makes use of a key technical result (Proposition F.5). The proof
of Proposition F.5 is rather lengthy and involves several auxiliary results, so it is relegated
to Appendix F (below). The proof of Theorem 6.3 also uses the next result, which is of
independent interest.
Proposition E.1 Let (X , µ) be a judgement problem. The following are equivalent.
(a) (X , µ) is supermajority determinate.
(b) For any x,y ∈ SSME (X , µ), we have γµ,x = γµ,y.
(c) Fφ(X , µ) = Fψ(X , µ) for any gain functions φ, ψ : [−1, 1]−→∗R.
(d) Fφ(X , µ) = Fψ(X , µ) for any continuous, real-valued gain functions φ, ψ : [−1, 1]−→R.
Proof: “(a)=⇒(b)” follows from Proposition 5.1 and the definition of supermajority de-
terminacy. “(b) =⇒ (c)” follows from Proposition 5.2(a) and Lemma C.7(c). “(c) =⇒
(d)” is obvious. “(d) =⇒ (b)” follows from Proposition 5.2(b) (by contrapositive). It
remains to prove “(b)=⇒(a)”. So, suppose γµ,x = γµ,y for all x,y ∈ SSME (X , µ).
Claim 1: SME (X , µ) ⊆ SSME (X , µ).
Proof: (by contrapositive) If z ∈ X \SSME (X , µ), then there exists ρ ∈ ∆(X ) such that
z 
µ
ρ —i.e. such that γµ,z ≤ γµ,ρ with at least one strict inequality. Without loss of
generality, suppose that ρ is (
µ
)-maximal in ∆(X ). Then supp(ρ) ⊆ SSME (X , µ).
Fix y ∈ SSME (X , µ); then our hypothesis says that γµ,x = γµ,y for all other x ∈
SSME (X , µ). Thus, γµ,ρ = γµ,y (because γµ,ρ is a convex combination of {γµ,x; x ∈
SSME (X , µ)}). Thus, γµ,z ≤ γµ,y, with at least one strict inequality. Thus, z µ y.
Thus, z 6∈ SME (X , µ). 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 implies that γµ,x = γµ,y for all x,y ∈ SME (X , µ). Thus, (X , µ) is supermajority
determinate. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.3. “=⇒” If µ ∈ ∆(X ) and Median (X , µ) = {x,y}, then
{x,y} ⊆ SME (X , µ). Thus, γx,µ = γy,µ, because X is supermajority determinate.
“⇐=” Suppose X is friendly. Let φ : [−1, 1]−→R be any continuous, real-valued gain
function. For any x,y ∈ X , define oBmx,y := {c ∈ C; Median (X , c) = {x,y}}, and define
Cφx := {c ∈ C ; x ∈ Fφ(c)} andBφx,y := Cφx ∩ Cφy .
Claim 1: oBmx,y ⊆Bφx,y ∪ (C \ Cφx).
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Proof: Let b ∈ oBmx,y; then b = µ˜ for some µ ∈ ∆(X ) such that Median (X , µ) = {x,y}.
Thus, the simplicity of X implies that γx,µ = γy,µ. There are now two cases:
• If x ∈ Fφ(X , µ), then Lemma C.7(c) says that y ∈ Fφ(X , µ) also; thus, b ∈Bφx,y.
• If x 6∈ Fφ(X , µ), then b ∈ C \ Cφx .
Thus, b ∈Bφx,y ∪ (C \ Cφx). This holds for all b ∈ oBmx,y. 3 Claim 1
Proposition F.5 and Claim 1 together imply that Fφ(X , µ) = Median (X , µ) for all µ ∈
∆(X ). But this argument works if φ is any continuous, real-valued gain function. Thus,
Fφ(X , µ) = Fψ(X , µ) for all continuous, real-valued gain functions φ, ψ : [−1, 1]−→R.
Thus, Proposition E.1 says that X is supermajority determinate. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.4. (c) follows immediately by combining (a) and (b).
(a) Suppose X is proximal. We claim that X is friendly. To see this, let x,y ∈ X , and let
µ ∈ ∆(X ) with Median (X , µ) = {x,y}. Then the vector µ˜ supports the edge {x,y}.
Thus, µ˜ • (x − y) = 0, and x IX y. Thus, d(x,y) ≤ 2 (by proximality). There are now
two cases.
Case 1. Suppose d(x,y) = 1. Then K±(x,y) = {i} for some i ∈ K. Thus, 0 =
µ˜• (x−y) = µ˜i(xi−yi), while xi 6= yi; thus, µ˜i = 0. Thus, µ˜ixi = µ˜iyi. Meanwhile,
clearly, µ˜kxk = µ˜kyk for all k ∈ K \ K±(x,y). Thus, γµ,x = γµ,y.
Case 2. Suppose d(x,y) = 2. Then K±(x,y) = {i, j} for some distinct i, j ∈ K. Thus,
0 = µ˜ • (x−y) = µ˜i(xi− yi) + µ˜j(xj − yj). Thus, µ˜i(xi− yi) = −µ˜j(xj − yj). There
are now two subcases.
• If xi = xj = −yi = −yj, then µ˜i = −µ˜j. Thus, µ˜ixi = µ˜jyj, while µ˜iyi = µ˜jxj.
• If xi = −xj = −yi = yj, then µ˜i = µ˜j. Thus, µ˜ixi = µ˜jyj, while µ˜iyi = µ˜jxj.
In either case, we also have µ˜kxk = µ˜kyk for all k ∈ K\K±(x,y). Thus, γµ,x = γµ,y.
In both cases, γµ,x = γµ,y. This holds whenever x IX y. We conclude that X is friendly.
Thus, Theorem 6.3 says that X is supermajority determinate.
(b) (by contrapositive) Suppose that X is also thick but not proximal. We will show that
X is not friendly, and thus, not supermajority efficient.
Let x ∈ X . For any c ∈ C, if c = µ˜ for some µ ∈ ∆(X ), then define γc,x := γµ,x. Given
some other y ∈ X , we define Dx,y := {c ∈ C; γc,x = γc,y}. Note that X is friendly if
and only if oBmx,y ⊆ Dx,y for all x IX y in X .
Claim 1: For any distinct x,y ∈ X , we have dim(Dx,y) ≤ K − dd(x,y)/2e.
Proof: Let J := K±(x,y), and for any c ∈ C, let cJ := (cj)j∈J ∈ RJ .
Let Π be the set of all permutations pi of J such that J = J0 unionsqJ1 unionsqJ2 unionsq · · · unionsq JN ,
where pi(j) = j for all j ∈ J0, and where each of J1, . . . ,JN is a pi-orbit of even
cardinality. For any pi ∈ Π and cJ ∈ RJ , define pi(cJ ) := (cpi(j))j∈J ∈ RJ . Then
define Dpix,y := {c ∈ C; pi(cJ ) = −cJ }.
Claim 1.1: dim(Dpix,y) ≤ K − dd(x,y)/2e.
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Proof: Suppose pi has orbit decomposition J = J0 unionsq J1 unionsq J2 unionsq · · · unionsq JN , as described
above. Then Dpix,y is the set of all c ∈ C satisfying the following linear constraints:
(a) cj = 0 for all j ∈ J0.
(b) For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], if Jn = {j, pi(j), pi2(j), . . . , piL(j)} (for some j ∈ J and
some odd L ∈ N), then cj = −cpi(j) = cpi2(j) = −cpi3(j) = · · · = −cpiL(j).
Let Jn := |Jn| for all n ∈ [0 . . . N ]. Then (a) imposes J0 linear constraints on c,
whereas (b) imposes (Jn − 1) distinct linear constraints on c for each n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
These constraints are all linearly independent, because they involve distinct coor-
dinats of c. Thus, the total number of linearly independent constraints on c is
J0 + (J1 − 1) + · · ·+ (JN − 1) = J0 + J1 + · · ·+ JN −N = J −N,
where J := |J | = d(x,y). Thus, dim(Dpix,y) ≤ K−J +N . But N ≤ bJ/2c, because
|Jn| ≥ 2 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Thus, K − J + N ≤ K − J + bJ/2c = K − dJ/2e.
O Claim 1.1
It is easy to check that γc,x = γc,y if and only if pi(c) = −c for some pi ∈ Π. Thus,
Dx,y =
⋃
pi∈ΠDpix,y, a finite union of sets of dimension K − dd(x,y)/2e or less. Thus,
dim(Dx,y) ≤ K − dd(x,y)/2e. 3 Claim 1
Now, if X is not proximal, then there exist x IX y ∈ X with d(x,y) ≥ 3. LetBmx,y := {c ∈
C; {x,y} ⊆ Median (X , c)}. If H0 := {r ∈ RK; (x− y) • r = 0}, thenBmx,y ⊆ C ∩H0.
Claim 2: C ∩ H0 6⊆ Dx,y.
Proof: Let H+ := {r ∈ RK; (x− y) • r > 0}, and let H− := {r ∈ RK; (x− y) • r < 0}.
Then x ∈ C ∩ H+, and y ∈ C ∩ H−. Thus, C ∩ H+ contains a relatively open
neighbourhood around x, while C ∩ H− contains a relatively open neighbourhood
around y (because H+ and H− are open subsets of RK.). But C is thick; thus C ∩H+
and C ∩ H− have nonempty interiors in RK. Any line segment from any point in
C ∩H+ to any point C ∩H− must pass through C ∩H0 somewhere. Thus, C ∩H0 is a
relatively open subset of H0; hence dim(C ∩ H0) = dim(H0) = K − 1 > K − d3/2e ≥
K − dd(x,y)/2e. Thus, Claim 1 implies that C ∩ H0 6⊆ Dx,y. 3 Claim 2
Recall that oBmx,y := {c ∈ C; Median (X , c) = {x,y}}.
Claim 3: oBmx,y 6⊆ Dx,y.
Proof: Let b ∈ oBmx,y. If b 6∈ Dx,y, then we’re done. So suppose b ∈ Dx,y. Claim 2 yields
some c ∈ (C ∩H0) \ Dx,y. For any r ∈ [0, 1], define cr := rc + (1− r)b. Observe that
cr ∈ C ∩ H0, because b ∈ C ∩ H0 and c ∈ C ∩ H0, while H0 and C are convex.
Now, Median (X ,b) = {x,y}, and the median rule is upper hemicontinuous (by
Proposition 3.5). Thus, if r is close enough to zero, then Median (X , cr) ⊆ {x,y}.
But since cr ∈ H0, this implies that Median (X , cr) = {x,y}; hence cr ∈ oBmx,y. Finally,
since c 6∈ Dxy we can choose r such that cr 6∈ Dxy. 3 Claim 3
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Claim 3 means that X is not friendly. Thus, the contrapositive of Theorem 6.3 says that
X is not supermajority determinate. 2
Proof of Proposition 6.5. Let x, z ∈ X comI,J with d(x, z) ≥ 3; we must show that
not(x IX z). It suffices to show that the line from x to y is not an edge of the polytope
conv(X ). Let
K++ := {k ∈ K ; xk = 1 = zk}, K+− := {k ∈ K ; xk = 1, zk = −1}
K−− := {k ∈ K ; xk = −1 = zk}, and K−+ := {k ∈ K ; xk = −1, zk = 1}.
Let K+− := |K+−| and K−+ := |K−+|. Then we have |x| = |K++| + K+− and |z| =
|K++|+K−+. But I ≤ |x| ≤ J and I ≤ |z| ≤ J (by definition of X comI,J ); thus,
I − |K++| ≤ K+− ≤ J − |K++| and I − |K++| ≤ K−+ ≤ J − |K++|. (E1)
Let K1+−,K2+− ⊆ K+− be two disjoint subsets such that K1+− unionsq K2+− = K+−, and such
that |K1+−| = bK+−/2c and |K2+−| = dK+−/2e. (Thus, if K+− ≥ 2, then both sets are
nonempty. If K+− = 1, then K1+− = ∅ and K2+− = K+−. If K+− = 0, then K1+− = ∅ =
K2+−.) Likewise, let K1−+,K2−+ ⊆ K−+ be two disjoint subsets with K1−+ unionsqK2−+ = K−+,
and such that |K1−+| = bK−+/2c and |K2−+| = dK−+/2e. Suppose without loss of
generality that K+− ≤ K−+. Then |K1+−| ≤ |K1−+| and |K2+−| ≤ |K2−+|. Thus
K+− = |K1+−|+ |K2+−| ≤ |K1+−|+ |K2−+| ≤ |K1−+|+ |K2−+| = K−+.
K+− = |K1+−|+ |K2+−| ≤ |K1−+|+ |K2+−| ≤ |K1−+|+ |K2−+| = K−+.
}
(E2)
Combining the inequalities (E1) and (E2), we obtain
I − |K++| ≤ |K1+−|+ |K2−+| ≤ J − |K++|,
and I − |K++| ≤ |K2+−|+ |K1−+| ≤ J − |K++|.
}
(E3)
Now define y1,y2 ∈ {±1}K as follows:
y1k :=
{
1 if k ∈ K1+− unionsq K++ unionsq K2−+;
−1 if k ∈ K2+− unionsq K−− unionsq K1−+;
and y2k :=
{
1 if k ∈ K2+− unionsq K++ unionsq K1−+;
−1 if k ∈ K1+− unionsq K−− unionsq K2−+.
 (E4)
Then the inequalities (E3) imply that I ≤ |y1| ≤ J and I ≤ |y2| ≤ J , so y1,y2 ∈ X comI,J .
Furthermore, note that, K+− + K−+ = d(x, z) ≥ 3, so either K+− ≥ 2 or K−+ ≥ 2.
Thus, either K1+− 6= ∅ 6= K2+−, or K1−+ 6= ∅ 6= K2−+. Either way, it is clear from the
defining equations (E3) that y1,y2 6∈ {x, z}. However, for every k ∈ K, we have
y1k + y
2
k =

2 if k ∈ K++
0 if k ∈ K+− unionsq K−+
−2 if k ∈ K−−
 = xk + zk.
Thus, (y1 + y2)/2 = (x + z)/2, so conv{x, z} ∩ conv{y1,y2} 6= ∅, so the line segment
conv{x, z} is not an edge of the polytope conv(X ); hence it can’t be an internal edge.
Thus, it is false that x IX z. This argument works whenever d(x,y) ≥ 3. Thus, X comI,J is
proximal. 2
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Proof of Proposition 6.6. Let x,y, z ∈ 4DM , so that x˜, y˜, z˜ ∈ X4D,M (as defined by
equation (12)). We say y is between x and z if, for every d ∈ [1 . . . D], we have either
xd ≤ yd ≤ zd or xd ≥ yd ≥ zd.
Now suppose x˜ IX z˜. Thus, there exists some µ ∈ ∆(X4D,M) such that Median
(X4D,M , µ) =
{x, z}. Proposition 1 of Lindner et al. (2010) says that Median (X4D,M , µ) is a convex
subset of X4D,M , which means that, for any y ∈ 4DM , if y is between x and z, then y˜ ∈
Median
(X4D,M , µ) also. Thus, if Median (X4D,M , µ) = {x˜, z˜}, then there are no other ele-
ments of4DM , between x and z. This means that there exist some c, e ∈ [1 . . . D] such that
xc = zc−1, xe = ze+1, and xd = zd for all d ∈ [1 . . . D]\{c, e}. Suppose zc = ` and xe = n.
Inspecting equation (12), we see that x˜(c,`) = −1 6= z˜(c,`) = 1 and x˜(e,n) = 1 6= z˜(e,n) = −1,
whereas x˜(d,m) = z˜(d,m) for all other (d,m) ∈ [1 . . . D]× [1 . . .M ] \ {(c, `), (e,m)}. Thus,
d(x˜, z˜) = 2. This argument works whenever x˜ IX z˜. Thus, X4D,M is proximal. 2
Proof of Proposition 6.7(a). We will prove the case |A| = 4; the proof for larger
|A| is similar. So, let A = {1, 2, 3, 4}. For any distinct a, b, c, d ∈ A, let xabcd ∈ X prA be
the element representing the ordering a  b  c  d. Observe that d(x1234,x4123) = 3
(because these two elements differ on exactly the propositions 1  4, 2  4, and 3  4).
However, we will show that x1234 IX x4123.
Let c := (x1234 + x4123)/2. Then Median (X prA , c) = {all elements of X prA between x1234
and x4123} = {all elements of X prA such that 1  2  3} = {x1234,x4123,x1243,x1423}.
Now, for any  > 0, define c := (1− ) c +  (x3421 + x3241)/2. If  is small enough, then
Median (X prA , c) ⊆ {x1234,x4123,x1243,x1423}, by upper hemicontinuity (Proposition 3.5).
But it is easy to check that
c • c1243 < c • x1234 = c • x4123 > c • x1423
Thus, Median (X prA , c) = {x1234,x4123}. Thus, x1234 IX x4123.
Thus, X prA is not proximal. But X prA is thick (Nehring and Pivato, 2011, Example 3.3),
so the contrapositive of Theorem 6.4(c) says X prA is not supermajority determinate. 2
Proposition E.2 Let S be a finite set, with S := |S| ≥ 4. Let X := {xs; s ∈ S}. Then
X is supermajority determinate.
Proof: Let µ ∈ ∆(X ). We claim that SME (X , µ) = argmax
x∈X
µ(x). We will use the following
easily verified fact:
For any k ∈ K, µ˜k := 2
∑
s∈k
µ(xs) − 1. (E5)
Claim 1: Let x,y ∈ X .
(a) If µ(x) = µ(y), then γx,µ = γy,µ.
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(b) If µ(x) > µ(y), then γx,µ ≥ γy,µ, with at least one strict inequality.
Proof: By the definition of X , we have x = xs and y = xt for some s, t ∈ S. Let k ∈ K.
If s, t ∈ k, then xk = yk = 1. If s, t 6∈ k, then xk = yk = −1. Either way, µ˜kxk = µ˜kyk.
Thus, the coordinates of interest are those in the sets
Kst := {k ∈ K ; s ∈ k and t 6∈ k} and Kts := {k ∈ K ; t ∈ k and s 6∈ k}
For any k ∈ Kst, define k′ := {t} unionsq k \ {s}; then k′ ∈ Kts. Likewise, for any k ∈ Kts,
define k′ := {s} unionsq k \ {t}; then k′ ∈ Kst. The map k 7→ k′ is an involution of Kst unionsqKts
—that is, a bijection from Kst unionsq Kts to itself, such that k′′ = k for all k ∈ Kst unionsq Kts.
Claim 1.1: (a) If µ(x) = µ(y), then xkµ˜k = yk′µ˜k′ for all k ∈ Kst unionsq Kts.
(b) If µ(x) > µ(y), then xkµ˜k > yk′µ˜k′ for all k ∈ Kst unionsq Kts.
Proof: Suppose k ∈ Kst. Then µ˜k′ () µ˜k + 2µ(y) − 2µ(x) ≤
(∗)
µ˜k, where () is by
Equation (E5), and (∗) is because µ(x) ≥ µ(y). Now, k ∈ Kst and k′ ∈ Kts, so
xk = 1 = yk′ , so yk′µ˜k′≤
(∗)
xkµ˜k. Meanwhile, xk′ = −1 = yk, so xk′µ˜k′≥
(∗)
ykµ˜k.
On the other hand, if k ∈ Kts, then k′ ∈ Kst, and an identical argument implies
that µ˜k′≥
(∗)
µ˜k. Meanwhile, xk′ = 1 = yk, so that xk′µ˜k′≥
(∗)
ykµ˜k. Also, yk′ = −1 = xk,
so that yk′µ˜k′≤
(∗)
xkµ˜k.
If µ(x) = µ(y), then all the inequalities (∗) are actually equalities; this proves
(a). If µ(x) > µ(y), then all the inequalities (∗) are strict inequalities; this proves
(b). O Claim 1.1
If µ(x) = µ(y), then Claim 1.1(a) implies that γx,µ = γy,µ. This proves (a). If
µ(x) > µ(y), then Claim 1.1(b) implies that γx,µ(q) > γy,µ(q) for any q such that
there is some k ∈ Kst with µ˜k > q > µ˜k′ . This proves (b). 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 implies that x 
µ
y if and only if µ(x) ≥ µ(y). Thus, SME (X , µ) = argmax
x∈X
µ(x).
Thus, if x,y ∈ SME (X , µ), then we must have µ(x) = µ(y), and then Claim 1(a) says
γµ,x = γµ,y. 2
F Identifying the median rule
The main result of this appendix (Proposition F.5) is a technical tool for determining when
a judgement aggregation rule F actually is equal to the median rule. This result was used
in the proof of Theorem 6.3 above. But before proving Proposition F.5, we must develop
some preliminaries. (The results in this section are also important for the companion
paper Nehring and Pivato (2012a).) Let X be a judgement space, and let C := conv(X ).
A judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X is a tally rule if there exists a function
F˜ : conv(X ) ⇒ X such that F (µ) = F˜ (µ˜) for all µ ∈ ∆(X ). For example, any additive
majority rule Fφ is a tally rule.
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If F is a tally rule on X and c ∈ conv(X ), and µ ∈ ∆(X ) is any profile such that µ˜ = c,
the we will often abuse notation and write “F (c)” to indicate F (µ). In particular, we will
use this notation for the median rule. Recall the definition of monotonicity from the end
of §3. The next result will be useful.
Lemma F.1 Let F be a monotone tally rule on X . Let c ∈ C, and let x ∈ F (c). Then
for any  ∈ (0, 1], F (x + (1− )c) = {x}.
Proof: Let δx ∈ ∆(X ) be the “unanimous” profile, such that δx(x) = 1 while δx(y) = 0
for all other y ∈ X . Let µ ∈ ∆(X ) be a profile such that µ˜ = c. Then for all  > 0, if
µ := δx+(1−)µ, then µ˜ = x+(1−)c. But monotonicity implies that F (µ˜) = {x}.
2
Let C := conv(X ), and let F : C ⇒ X be a tally rule. For any x ∈ X , we define
CFx := {c ∈ C ; x ∈ F (c)} and oCFx := {c ∈ C ; F (c) = {x}}.
Next, for any x,y ∈ X , we define BFx,y := CFx ∩ CFy = {c ∈ C ; x,y ∈ F (c)}. Finally,
let ∂∗ CFx be the relative boundary of CFx as a subset of C, and let int
(CFx ) be the relative
interior of CFx . That is: ∂∗ CFx := CFx ∩ cl
(C \ CFx ) and int (CFx ) := CFx \ ∂∗ CFx .
Lemma F.2 Let F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X be an upper hemicontinuous, monotone tally rule, and
let x ∈ X . Then:
(a) int
(CFx ) = oCFx . (b) oCFx is connected.
(c) CFx = cl
(
oCFx
)
. (d) BFx,y ⊆ ∂∗ CFx for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
Proof: (c) “⊇” Clearly, CFx ⊇ oCFx . To show that CFx ⊇ cl
(
oCFx
)
, it suffices to observe that
CFx is closed, because F is upper hemicontinuous by hypothesis.
“⊆” Let c ∈ CFx . For any r ∈ (0, 1), let cr := rx + (1 − r)c. Clearly, lim
r→0
cr = c.
Thus, c ∈ cl (oCFx ), because Lemma F.1 says that that cr ∈ oCFx for all r > 0.
(b) For any c ∈ oCFx , the proof of part (c) shows that the line segment from x to c is in oCFx .
Thus, oCFx is path-connected, hence connected.
(d) Let b ∈BFx,y. Then b ∈ CFx and b ∈ CFy . Thus, part (c) implies that b ∈ cl
(
oCFy
)
. But
oCFy ⊂ C \ CFx . Thus, b is in both CFx and cl
(C \ CFx ). Thus, b ∈ ∂∗ CFx .
(a) To see int
(CFx ) ⊇ oCFx , note that
oCFx := {c ∈ C ; F (c) = x} = C \
⋃
y∈X\{x}
CFy . (F1)
Now
⋃
y∈X\{x} CFy is closed because X is finite and CFy is closed for any y ∈ X (because
F is upper hemicontinuous). Thus, eqn.(F1) makes oCFx a relatively open subset of C;
thus, oCFx ⊆ int
(CFx ).
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To see int
(CFx ) ⊆ oCFx , note that
cl
(C \ oCFx ) (∗) ⋃
y∈X\{x}
CFy ()
⋃
y∈X\{x}
cl
(
oCFy
)
(†) cl
 ⋃
y∈X\{x}
oCFy
 ⊆ cl (C \ CFx ) . (F2)
Here, (∗) is by eqn.(F1), () is by applying part (c) to each y ∈ X \ {x}, and (†) is
because X is finite.
Taking the complement of both sides of (F2), we get C \ cl (C \ oCFx ) ⊇ C \ cl (C \ CFx ),
which is equivalent to int
(
oCFx
) ⊇ int (CFx ), which means oCFx ⊇ int (CFx ) (because oCFx is
relatively open). 2
Lemma F.3 Let F,G : ∆(X ) ⇒ R be upper hemicontinuous, monotone tally rules. The
following are equivalent:
(a) CFx ⊆ CGx for all x ∈ X .
(b) oCFx ⊆ oCGx for all x ∈ X .
(c) F = G.
Proof: The statement “(c) =⇒ (b)” is immediate. The statement “(b) =⇒ (a)” follows
Lemma F.2(c). It remains to show “(a) =⇒ (c)”. So suppose CFx ⊆ CGx for all x ∈ X .
Claim 1: For all x ∈ X , we have: (i) oCGx ⊆ oCFx , and (ii) cl
(
oCGx
) ⊆ cl (oCFx ).
Proof: (i) Suppose c ∈ oCGx . Then for all y ∈ X \ {x}, c 6∈ CGy ; hence the contrapositive
of hypothesis (a) says c 6∈ CFy , so y 6∈ F (c). Thus, if x 6∈ F (c), then F (c) = ∅, which
is impossible. Thus, x ∈ F (c), which means that F (c) = {x}; hence c ∈ oCFx .
(ii) Follows immediately by taking the closure in part (i). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: For all x ∈ X , we have CGx = CFx .
Proof: Combining Claim 1(ii) and Lemma F.2(c), we get CGx ⊆ CFx . But CGx ⊇ CFx by
hypothesis. Thus, CGx = CFx . 3 Claim 2
Thus, for any c ∈ C and any x ∈ X , we have(
x ∈ F (c)
)
⇐⇒
(
c ∈ CFx
)
⇐
(∗)⇒
(
c ∈ CGx
)
⇐⇒
(
x ∈ G(c)
)
,
where (∗) is by Claim 2. Thus, F = G. 2
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Now, for any x,y ∈ X , define Cmx := {c ∈ C ; x ∈ Median (X , c)} andBmx,y := Cmx ∩ Cmy =
{c ∈ C; {x,y} ∈ Median (X , c)}. Then Cmx andBmx,y are closed, because the median rule is
upper hemicontinuous by Proposition 3.5. Next, define oBmx,y := {c ∈ C; Median (X , c) =
{x,y}}, a subset of Bmx,y. Observe that x IX y if and only if oBmx,y 6= ∅. Let Y(x) :=
{y ∈ X ; y IX x}. Finally, the “internal boundary” of Cmx inside C is the set ∂∗ Cmx :=
Cmx ∩ cl (C \ Cmx ).
Lemma F.4 For all x ∈ X , we have ∂∗ Cmx =
⋃
y∈Y(x)
cl
(
oBmx,y
)
.
Proof: “⊇” For all y ∈ Y(x), we have oBmx,y ⊆Bmx,y ⊆ Cmx , while Cmx is closed.
“⊆” Let D := dim(C). We begin with four claims.
Claim 1: cl (C \ Cmx ) =
⋃
y∈X\{x}
Cmy .
Proof: “⊆” X =
⋃
y∈X
Cmy , so C \ Cmx ⊆
⋃
y∈X\{x}
Cmy . Thus, cl (C \ Cmx ) ⊆
⋃
y∈X\{x}
Cmy ,
because the right hand expression is closed (being a finite union of closed sets).
“⊇” Let c ∈
⋃
y∈X\{x}
Cmy . Then c ∈ Cmy for some y ∈ X \ {x}. Then for all  > 0,
Lemma F.1 says that Median (X , y + (1− )c) = {y}, because the median rule is
monotone, by Proposition 3.4(a). Thus, y + (1 − )c ∈ C \ Cmx , for all  > 0. But
y + (1− )c−−−−→0→c. Thus, c ∈ cl (C \ Cmx ). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: For any distinct x,y, z ∈ X , if Bmx,y,z := {c ∈ C; Median (X , c) ⊇ {x,y, z}},
then dim(Bmx,y,z) ≤ D − 2.
Proof: Let A be the affine subspace of RK spanned by X (so C ⊂ A, and D = dim(A)).
Let A0 := span(X − X ); then A0 is a linear subspace of RK parallel to A (and
dim(A0) = D also). Define A0x,y,z := {a ∈ A0; (x − y) • a = (x − z) • a = 0}. The
vectors (x−y) and (x−z) are linearly independent elements ofA0; thus, dim(A0x,y,z) =
D−2. Now let Ax,y,z := {a ∈ A; (x−y)•a = (x−z)•a = 0}. Then Ax,y,z is an affine
subspace of RK parallel to A0x,y,z, so dim(Ax,y,z) = D − 2 also. But Bmx,y,z ⊆ Ax,y,z;
thus, dim(Bmx,y,z) ≤ D − 2. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: If x ∈ X and y ∈ X \ Y(x), then dim(Bx,y) ≤ D − 2.
Proof: If y ∈ X \ Y(x), then there is no µ ∈ ∆(X ) such that Median (X , µ) = {x,y}.
Thus, for all b ∈ Bmx,y, there is some z ∈ X \ {x,y} such that b ∈ Bmx,y,z. In other
words, Bmx,y =
⋃
z∈X\{x,y} Bmx,y,z, a finite union of sets of dimension D − 2 or less (by
Claim 2). Thus, dim(Bx,y) ≤ D − 2. 3 Claim 3
Claim 4: dim(∂∗ Cmx ) = D − 1.
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Proof: Lemma F.2(a,c) implies that ∂∗ Cmx is the boundary of oCmx . But oCmx is a con-
vex, relatively open subset of C, by the formula (6) defining the median rule. Since
dim(C) = D, we have dim(∂∗ Cmx ) = D − 1. 3 Claim 4
Now we have
∂∗ Cmx = Cmx ∩ cl (C \ Cmx ) (∗) Cmx ∩
 ⋃
y∈X\{x}
Cmy
 = ⋃
y∈X\{x}
(Cmx ∩ Cmy )
=
⋃
y∈X\{x}
Bmx,y =
⋃
y∈Y(x)
Bmx,y ∪
⋃
y∈X\Y(x)
Bmx,y
=
(A)︷ ︸︸ ︷⋃
y∈Y(x)
oBmx,y ∪
(B)︷ ︸︸ ︷⋃
y∈Y(x)
⋃
z∈X\{x,y}
Bmx,y,z ∪
(C)︷ ︸︸ ︷⋃
y∈X\Y(x)
Bmx,y,
where (∗) is by Claim 1. Now, X and Y(x) are finite sets, and Claim 2 says that every
element in the union (B) is a set of dimension D − 2 or less. Also, X \ Y(x) is a finite
set, and Claim 3 says that every element in the union (C) is a set of dimension D − 2
or less. Thus Claim 4 implies that the unions (B) and (C) are nowhere dense in ∂∗ Cmx .
Thus, the union (A) must be dense in ∂∗ Cmx . Thus,
∂∗ Cmx = cl
 ⋃
y∈Y(x)
oBmx,y
 = ⋃
y∈Y(x)
cl
(
oBmx,y
)
,
because it is a finite union. 2
We now come to the main result of this appendix.
Proposition F.5 Let X be a judgement space, and let G : ∆(X ) ⇒ X be an upper
hemicontinuous, monotone tally rule. Suppose oBmx,y ⊆BGx,y ∪ (C \ CGx ) for every x,y ∈ X .
Then G(X , µ) = Median (X , µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(X )
Example F.6. Let φ : [−1, 1]−→R be a continuous, real-valued gain function, and
let X be a judgement space. Then Fφ is upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 3.5) and
monotone (by Proposition 3.4(a)). Thus, if oBmx,y ⊆Bφx,y ∪ (C \ Cφx) for every x,y ∈ X , then
Proposition F.5 says that Fφ(X , µ) = Median (X , µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(X ). ♦
Proof of Proposition F.5. According to Lemma F.3, it suffices to establish the following
statement:
CGx ⊆ Cmx , for every x ∈ X . (F3)
To verify statement (F3), first note that
∂∗ Cmx (∗)
⋃
y∈X\{x}
cl
(
oBmx,y
) ⊆
()
⋃
y∈X\{x}
cl
(BGx,y ∪ C \ CGx ) = ⋃
y∈X\{x}
cl
(BGx,y) ∪ cl (C \ CGx )
(@)
⋃
y∈X\{x}
BGx,y ∪ cl
(C \ CGx ) ⊆
(†)
∂∗ CGx ∪ cl
(C \ CGx ) (‡) cl (C \ CGx ) . (F4)
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Here, (∗) is by Lemma F.4, () is by the theorem hypothesis, and (@) is because G is
upper hemicontinuous. Next, (†) is by applying Lemma F.2(d) to ∂∗ CGx . Finally (‡) is
because ∂∗ CGx ⊆ cl
(C \ CGx ) by definition.
It follows that
int (Cmx ) unionsq int (C \ Cmx ) = C \ (∂∗ Cmx ) ⊇
(∗)
C \ cl (C \ CGx ) = int (CGx ) ,
where (∗) is by equation (F4). But int (CGx ) is connected, by Lemma F.2(a,b). Thus, we
must have either int
(CGx ) ⊆ int (Cmx ), or int (CGx ) ⊆ int (C \ Cmx ). However, x ∈ int (CGx )
and x ∈ int (Cmx ) (by monotonicity). Thus, we must have int
(CGx ) ⊆ int (Cmx ). Take the
closures and apply Lemma F.2(c) to get CGx ⊆ Cmx , as desired. 2
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